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Zusammenfassung
In dieser Arbeit wird versucht, die Möglichkeiten von Ministerialverwaltungen zur Beein-
flussung politischer Entscheidungsprozesse theoretisch zu fassen und anschließend quan-
titativ zu beschreiben.
Das theoretische Konzept beschreibt den Einfluss von Bürokratien als aus drei Quellen
kommend: den Organisationsstrukturen der Bürokratie selbst, dem Entscheidungsspiel-
raum, der ihr als Folge bestimmter Präferenzkonstellationen der politischen Akteure er-
wächst, sowie der Möglichkeit der Bürokratie, unter bestimmten Umständen die Setzung
der politischen Tagesordnung anstelle der politischen Akteure zu übernehmen.
Mit dem Ziel eines Vergleichs der relativen Einflussposition ihrer nationalen Minis-
terialbürokratien wird eine quantitative Beschreibung der Ministerialverwaltungssysteme
von 21 OECD-Ländern geliefert.
Die Arbeit schließt mit einer empirischen Klassifikation von Verwaltungssystemen.
Japan, Belgien und Irland werden als Länder beschrieben, in denen die Ministerialbüro-
kratie auf allen drei theoretisch etablierten Dimensionen relativ einflussstark ist. Das an-
dere Ende des Einflussspektrums wird von Neuseeland mit einer vergleichsweise schwa-
chen Bürokratie eingenommen.
Abstract
This paper sets out to theoretically conceptualise and empirically describe the potential
ability of ministerial bureaucracies to influence policy-making.
The theoretical framework describes the chances for bureaucracies to influence policy-
making as accruing from three sources: the organisational structures of the bureaucracy
itself, room for bureaucratic discretion resulting from the preference configurations of the
political actors, and the chance for the bureaucracy to act as political agenda setter rather
than politicians.
A quantitative empirical description of 21 OECD-countries is presented with the aim of
comparing the relative strengths of the national ministerial bureaucracies.
The paper concludes with an empirical classification of administrative systems. Japan,
Belgium, and Ireland are found to be countries with a strong position for the bureaucracy
in all of the theoretically described dimensions. The opposite end of the spectrum is
marked by New Zealand, where the bureaucracy appears to be comparatively weak.
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Kai-Uwe Schnapp
Ministerial Bureaucracies as Stand-In Agenda Setters?
A Comparative Description
1 Introduction1
In the political science and public administration literature there is a virtual consensus that
bureaucracies have an impact on policy at both the implementation phase as well as the
planning stage. This is documented by a wealth of case-oriented empirical studies with a
benign as well as a rather hostile perspective towards bureaucracies (see Barberis (1996) as
a recent, Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) as well as Campbell and Szablowski (1979) as very
important but slightly dated examples for the more benign, and Kellner and Crowther-Hunt
(1980) as an outstanding example for the rather hostile perspective). But analyses of eve-
ryday experience, showing the impact of administrators, do not translate easily into any
kind of generalisation. The most important problem with these case-oriented studies is that
they lack a common theoretical framework suitable for comparative analysis. As a conse-
quence, the question this paper tries to answer is threefold:
1) Can the potential ability of ministerial bureaucracies to influence policy-making be
theoretically conceptualised in a meaningful way?
2) Is it possible to find quantitative indicators that capture elements of such a theoretical
concept?
3) How do different countries compare with regard to the potential impact of their
national level bureaucracies on policy-making?
Acting capacities of bureaucracies have been described recently with two formal concepts.
The first describes the possibilities for bureaucrats to use the bureaucratic (organisational)
decision-making process to influence decision outcomes (Hammond 1986). The second
                                                
1 A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Conference “The Quest for Governance:
Reforms, Renovations, and Retrenchments in Government for the 21st Century” of the IPSA Study
Group on Government (SOG) in November 1999. I thank the participants in this conference for helpful
comments. I wish to thank the two editors of Governance Bert Rockman and Jon Pierre for commenting,
and Tom Christensen, Mark Considine, Ulrich Klöti, Akira Nakamura and Kikuti Masao for helping me
complete information on Norway, New Zealand and Australia, Switzerland, and Japan respectively
where I was not able to draw just from official sources. Bernhard Wessels and Jutta Horstmann at the
WZB commented extensively on the second version of the paper providing very helpful suggestions. I
thank Katarina Pollner and Daniel Ziblatt for help with the English editing of the text.
2describes the room to manoeuvre that results as a consequence of the preference configu-
ration of the political actors (Hammond and Knott 1996).
Each of these concepts captures a different but important element of bureaucratic influ-
ence on policy-making. I integrate these ideas and propose an addition that shows when
and how bureaucrats can become what I call “stand-in agenda setters” in the policy-making
process.
In order to do this I loosen the assumption that political players always have clear policy
preferences. This is reflected in a spatial model to be developed by substituting ideal points
with ideal ranges. Additionally, the model can account for the limited acting capacities (re-
sources) of political actors (parliament and cabinet alike).
It is explicitly modelled why and how politicians may have ideal ranges instead of ideal
points. In order to do this I introduce a concept of saliency where saliency is understood as
an aggregate of (1) the priority a given politician has for a certain policy, (2) the clarity of
the preference she has about this policy, and (3) the distance of the status quo of this policy
to the ideal point (or range) of the politician.
This paper demonstrates that as a consequence of the interplay of limited resources and
ideal ranges bureaucracies can stand in as effective agenda setters under clearly identified
circumstances (no political actors put forward a proposal on a certain problem, chances
exist for the bureaucracy to increase its utility by advancing a policy proposal, the minister
is willing to sponsor the bureaucratic proposal into the political process of decision-
making).
In the empirical section I present a number of indicators for the structural characteristics
of the bureaucratic and political policy-making apparatus, that have been modelled to have
an effect on bureaucratic chances to influence policy-making. The data presented covers up
to 21 OECD countries (see Table 9 for a list of countries) and is partly based on quantita-
tive indicators and partly on aggregations of qualitative descriptions of national political-
administrative systems. I try to provide information from 1970 onwards. However, in
many cases data is only available from 1980 or in some cases after 1990.
As a consequence of the comparative design not all peculiarities of a country’s adminis-
trative system and policy process can be given due attention. Informal rules and informal
behaviour do have their impact on political strategies and policy output, guided by admin-
istrative as well as a more general political culture. But with a comparative perspective, as
it is attempted here, these details need to be left out of the perspective so that the argument
can be advanced in a structured manner.
To my knowledge, no account has attempted yet to model the impact of structural
features of national ministerial bureaucracies on policy-making in a comparative study of
broad scope. One reason for this seems to be the difficulty of gathering data that describes
3bureaucracies in a way conducive to such analysis. A number of researchers have com-
plained, time and again, about the status of quantitative comparative administrative
research (Peters 1988: Introduction; Page 1992: 2-3; Pierre 1995; Peters 1996). Luckily,
recent developments within the OECD, especially the efforts of the Public Management
Project (PUMA) as well as some other institutions have produced comparative information
that can be moulded into a unified body of data. This enables us to conduct broad-based
quantitative comparisons that hitherto have not been possible.
Eventually, the classification developed here will have to be tested against appropriate
measures of policy output in order to evaluate the model and its operationalisation. One
can think of budget volatility as potential dependent variable with the hypothesis that
decision-making processes dominated by the bureaucracy yield less volatile budgets than
decision-making processes dominated by the political players. If this hypothesis proves to
be true that would imply that politicians are better able to realise their intentions with a
comparatively weaker bureaucracy or, from the opposite point of view, that strong
bureaucracies facilitate continuity in policy-making. Whether a high policy adaptability or
a high policy continuity is the more desirable condition remains yet another question. From
the view point of budgeting, a recent World Bank paper emphasised the positive effects of
continuity accruing from the involvement of technocratic bureaucrats in the process of
policy-making (World Bank 2000). Politicians, on the other hand, often complain about the
fact that their hands are tied by refractory bureaucrats. But this more normative discussion
is not pursued here.
The paper proceeds as follows: First, I demonstrate how and why bureaucrats can have
an impact on policy-making at the national level. Second, a set of indicators is introduced
that are intended to measure the characteristics that define bureaucratic ability to
participate in policy-making according to the model. In a third step a quantitative
description for a number of countries along the concept and indicators developed so far is
presented. In the conclusion, countries are characterised by the strength of the potential of
their bureaucracies to take an active part in policy-making and an outlook is given how this
typology might be used in further research.
42 Bureaucrats, Agendas, and Political Decision-Making
2.1 Policy-making and the veto model
Policy-making has recently often been modelled with the veto model. This model allows to
explain policy stability and change as a function of the institutional setting and the prefer-
ences of the veto players in a political system (Hammond 1996, Tsebelis 1995).
Veto models are used to define those participants in a decision-making process who play
pivotal roles for the final outcome of the decision process. “Veto players are individual or
collective decision makers whose agreement is required for the change of the status quo”
(Tsebelis 1995). The potential to veto a decision may or may not be used according to the
preferences of the actors.
In parliamentary systems the party or parties in political power are usually counted as
veto players. In presidential regimes the president is an additional veto player, as can be
second chambers where they have a genuine impact on policy-making. The former are also
referred to as partisan, the latter as institutional veto players. When ideological differences
between different institutional and/or partisan veto players become (too) small two or more
veto players may effectively become one veto player and are then to be counted as such
(Tsebelis 1995, 1999).
The veto concept cannot be understood as a concept of policy-making. Since its main
interest is the explanation of policy stability it could almost be described as a concept for
the explanation of policy prevention. It is concerned with the ability of participants in a
decision process (veto players) to prevent unwanted decision-outcomes from happening by
using the power of the veto position and the possible consequences of this power as a
threat in processes of political bargaining. It is not concerned with the ability and ways to
positively frame decisions. Veto players define whether new policies are possible and
which policies are possible by the power of their necessary consent and by the position of
their preferences in the policy-space in relation to each other and in relation to the status
quo (abbreviated as SQ).
Bureaucracy can, in contrast to the partisan and institutional veto players, be understood
as a framer and shaper of decision options, but a bureaucracy lacks the specific ability to
involve itself in the decision procedure by the power of a formal veto. This conclusion
could be countered with the argument that there exists a veto point for the bureaucracy, at
least in specific situations. For example, bureaucrats could try to block policies by arguing
to their principals (the minister or the cabinet) that a policy proposal is against a particular
law or is not covered by the expenditure frame appropriated in the government budget. In
both circumstances (law or budget), however, this “veto” can at best be suspensive,
5because the law can be changed and moneys appropriated at political will. It is very un-
likely that bureaucrats can effectively block policy using this “bureaucratic veto” at the
national level for a long period of time if politicians really want a certain change.
This may be different with administrations at the state (Länder/province) or local level.
The law cannot (or only in certain policy areas as far as the state-level is concerned) be
changed at that level of government, leaving more possibilities to use the conformity with
the law as an effective veto instrument for the bureaucracy. But these lower level admini-
strations are not discussed here. At the national level it is not reasonable to model bureauc-
racies as veto players because they lack the respective institutional devices. Bureaucracies
cannot, in democratic systems and under normal circumstances, become veto players.
Even though bureaucracies are not veto players themselves, they have more recently
been successfully integrated into the veto framework, as Hammond (1996), Hammond and
Knott (1996), and Hammond (1999) demonstrated. The veto model was used in these
works to explicitly model the bureaucracy’s room to manoeuvre in the face of different
institutional structures of the national polity as well as different preference distributions of
veto players. This point will be argued in more detail in the next section.
2.2 Bureaucratic impact on political decision-making
There are at least two paths for bureaucratic influence on policy-making that have recently
been described in the literature.
1) Bureaucracies can use organisational structures to co-define what policy options
become available to political decision makers in inner-administrative decision process.
According to Hammond (1986) organisational structures can be used by strategically
acting bureaucrats to have an impact on decision outcomes. This point will be taken up
in section 2.2.1.
2) It was stated above that the veto model was used to describe bureaucracy’s room to
manoeuvre depending on the institutional structure of the national polity as well as the
preference distribution of the veto players. This point is the subject of section 2.2.2.
As I will argue in this paper, there is yet another way in which bureaucracies may influ-
ence policy-making. Under certain circumstances bureaucracies can act as agenda setters
by proposing policy initiatives to their political superiors who can officially bring these
proposals into the political decision process. Under normal circumstances, however,
bureaucracies will be weak or ineffective agenda setters. That means that all proposals put
forward by the bureaucracy are subject to open amendment rule afterwards and can thus be
6shifted to any point in the policy space that is suitable to the players that act later in the
game (cf. Alt/Shepsle 1998 for a typology of agenda setters). Bureaucracies may define the
political agenda, but they do not have much impact on the content of the final policy deci-
sion. As can be derived from Hammond and Knott (1996), however, there are circum-
stances where bureaucracies can become effective agenda setters.
Whether bureaucracies can become effective agenda setters is conditional on the prefer-
ence configuration of the political veto players as well as on structural features of the
policy-making process that have an impact on the bureaucracies ability to effectively act as
agenda setter, as I develop in section 2.2.3.
Before discussing routes of bureaucratic influence, a note about preferences is necessary.
The veto as well as the agenda setting idea generally imply that we know something about
the preferences of the actors involved. Although exact knowledge of the preferences is not
necessary for the arguments developed in this article, we need to be sure, that the actors do
have preferences.
For the political actors, the existence of preferences is a matter of course. After all, this
is what politics is about, having preferences and bring them to bear on political decisions.
Preference structures of political actors have been measured as their political positions on a
uni-dimensional left-right-scale by expert-surveys (Castles/Mair 1984, Huber/Inglehart
1995) or as positions in a multidimensional policy-space by content analyses of party
manifestos (Volkens 1995)2. Results of the expert surveys have already been used in veto
analyses (Tsebelis 1995, 1999).
For bureaucrats, it is not quite as self-evident that they do actually have policy prefer-
ences. As Egeberg (1995) points out, there are preferences in the sphere of the bureaucrat’s
own interest, i.e. administrative politics. Here we can expect bureau shaping (Dunleavy
1991), and budget maximising intentions (Niskanen 1971), or a mix of the two. It is plau-
sible as well, as Krause (2000) demonstrates, to expect that bureaucrats have clear prefer-
ences about the amount of discretion they would like to have on a certain policy. In
addition bureaucracies are likely to have preferences about the means they would use to
solve a certain policy problem as is demonstrated Aberbach et al. (1981: chapter 4).
More important, however, is the fact that many bureaucrats do have political convictions
and preferences as well. This too was shown by Aberbach et al. (1981: chapters 4 and 5).
These preferences can have causes strictly confined to the individual bureaucrat, but they
can be consequences of professional interactions as well. The mission-minded bureaucrat
for example, who has frequent contacts with interest groups in her field of responsibility
may take over the policy views of her clientele. She may thus become an actor in the
                                                
2 For a recent discussion of advantages and disadvantages of these different techniques and their
consequences see McDonald/Mendes 1999, Budge 2000, Huber/Gabel 2000.
7policy game who is not only guided by standards of good practice and bureaucratic self-
interest but by (ideological) ideas and respective preferences.
It can be concluded that, even though bureaucrat’s preferences will most often not be
openly observable (Egeberg 1995), we can work with the assumption of their very exis-
tence. It is therefore plausible to theoretically describe preference configurations in which
the room to manoeuvre for the bureaucracies develops and to describe structural situations
which further the development of room for bureaucratic discretion. That means, we can
describe the structural situation of a bureaucracy in a way that allows for statements of the
type “if the situation of a bureaucracy is of a type A then action possibilities B result for
it.” Please note the intentional use of the word “possibilities.” It is only a potential for
bureaucratic action that can be derived from structural characteristics. Whether bureaucrats
do indeed use this structurally defined potential depends on their actual preferences and
probably on yet more factors not considered here. These questions have to be left to future
research.
Having discussed the question of existence of bureaucratic preferences, I can now
proceed to the description of the first type of bureaucratic impact on political decisions.
2.2.1 Strategic use of organisational structures
Bureaucracies can use organisational structures to influence final decision outcomes.
Hammond (1986: 381-383) equates the consequences of organisational structures on deci-
sion outcomes with the consequences that agendas can have on decision outcomes. With
agendas, it depends on the sequence in which the alternatives are set against each other in
voting rounds as well as on the preferences of the actors which alternative will finally pre-
vail.
Voters with complete knowledge of the sequence of alternatives and of the preferences
of the other voters can try to deliberately steer the voting process into a direction favour-
able to their own preferences. This is commonly referred to as strategic voting.
Strategic voting describes a behaviour where true preferences may be concealed and
outcomes are voted for, that are not the most preferred outcomes of a given actor. Strategic
voting occurs because (and only when) a game has more than one decision stage. Con-
sidering the whole game and the likely decisions of actors at later stages (game theorists
call this “backward induction” or more colloquially “working the game tree backwards”) it
is possible for an actor to find that a choice which is not her preferred choice will never-
theless lead the final decision closer to her ideal point than a vote according to her prefer-
ences. A vote according to once preferences is known as a “sincere vote.” The last voter in
8a chain of decisions never votes strategically but always sincerely because there are no
other players to whom her decision is an input to their own decision (see Hammond 1986:
393-398 with graphical examples and references to a wider literature on strategic and
sincere voting).
Organisational structures allow for strategic voting because they too order decision
alternatives to occur in a certain sequence. The ministerial organisational structures are
mechanisms for the purpose of preparing, processing, and filtering information with the
goal to reach policy decisions. Within these structures people that are later in the process or
likewise higher up in the hierarchy critically depend on input, advice, preselection, propos-
als and alternatives put forward by their predecessors in the process, i.e. by their subordi-
nates. That means by implication that people at various levels of the decision-making hier-
archy have an impact on a decision. That is even more the case, when actors use their
knowledge about the process and the other actors in the process to strategically influence
the final decision outcome.
The final stage in ministerial decision-making does not usually involve a multitude of
participants, but only the minister herself. This means that any alternative actually making
it to the minister could be chosen by her. But not all matters are decided by the minister
herself. Since the resources to digest information and decide upon matters are limited even
for the most industrious decision maker there have to be rules to decide when to deal with
a matter and when not.
In the ministerial setting that turns into the question when to interfere with proposals
coming up through the hierarchy to a given management level and when not to interfere.
One of the commonly used decision rules is the so called “Management by Exception”
(MBE). MBE means that officials, including the minister, usually “rubber stamp” the pro-
posals (advice) coming up to them when there is a consensus among their subordinates or
advisers about the matter. They only interfere in exceptional situations, i.e. when
concordant advice is lacking or when they are really concerned about a certain policy
matter. If bureaucrats succeed in providing their minister with concordant proposals their
chances are increased that the minister will approve of these proposals without interference
(Hammond 1986: 391).
Knowledge of this commonly applied rule in conjunction with knowledge about the
organisational structures and the preferences of co-workers as well as superiors can give
officials in the lower ranks of the hierarchy the possibility to steer a decision process
towards an outcome closer to their own ideal point by sending advice up the hierarchy that
aggregates into consensual proposals delivered to the minister or respective final decision
maker. This mechanism can, of course, not be successfully employed under any preference
9configurations among the bureaucrats, but it is still a formidable instrument in the hands of
an astute bureaucrat.
It is a precondition for this instrument to work that bureaucrats know the preferences of
their superiors and colleagues. As Rose (1987) and Barker and Wilson (1997) showed,
bureaucrats do know the preferences of their political superiors quite well. It is equally
likely that they know the preferences of their co-workers so that it is not an uneasy
assumption that bureaucrats have the informational prerequisites for strategic action.
The possibility to use organisational structures to strategically influence decision out-
comes can be countered, however, by certain changes to this very structure. It can be con-
cluded from Hammond’s analysis that ministers are more likely to achieve their preferred
decision outcomes the more they are able to appoint officials to places further down in the
hierarchy who are close to their own ideal points. Hammond argues that officials are more
likely to achieve their preferred outcome in a decision process (or get closer to it) the
higher up in the hierarchy they are (1986: 415). This is so because they can influence the
process when there are only few decision stages left in which further aggregation can redi-
rect a proposal. Taking this argument in reverse, the further down into a hierarchy the
minister can plant close trustees, the higher are the aggregate chances to influence deci-
sion-making in a way favourable to her political goals (preferences).
Concluding this section, it can be said that bureaucrats can use organisational structures
through strategic voting in order to influence decision outcomes. Their chances of bringing
final decisions in line with their own preferences can, however, be limited by their supe-
riors through structural “counter measures.” How far ministers are allowed such counter
measures is an empirical question. I shall return to this point in section 3.1.
In this section I described a type of bureaucratic influence that originates inside the
structures of the ministerial apparatus. In the next section I take up a type of bureaucratic
influence on policy-making that arises as a consequence of the interactions between the
preferences of the political actors in the policy-making process.
2.2.2 Bureaucratic room to manoeuvre, the core, and the gate
The basic conceptual tools that are needed for the description of the bureaucratic room to
manoeuvre are the spatial concepts of core and gate. They are introduced in this section.
For a more extensive treatment of the spatial models with implications for bureaucratic
discretion I refer the reader to Hammond and Knott (1996) and Hammond (1999).
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Defining the core
Figure 1 depicts a one dimensional policy space in which four veto players (A-D) are
placed according to their ideal point. An ideal point (IP)is defined as the preferred point of
a player in a preference—here policy-space. The set of points between B and C, the
median players, is called the core. The core’s important characteristic is that none of the
points between B and C (inside the core) can be beaten in a vote by any other point in the
policy space. In other words, any policy status quo inside the core is in equilibrium. A
policy status quo outside the core, however, can always be moved inside the core.
As visible in Figure 1 the core has a certain size. The basic determinants of this size are:
- the number of veto players,
[When there is an odd number of veto players in a political system then there is only one median
player. In this situation the size of the core shrinks the ideal point of the median veto player. This core
is called a point-core.]
- and ideological distance between median players (provided that there are two median
players).
[Hammond and Butler 1996 describe a variety of configurations for parliamentary as well as presi-
dential regimes demonstrating the effects of ideological distance between median players on the size
of the core and describing which players are median players under variants of party coherence and
party voting.]
A detailed discussion of the meaning of the core and the logic of core forming processes
can be found in Hammond and Knott (1996) and Hammond and Butler (1996).
Figure 1: An Illustration of Core and Gate
A B C D
CORE
GateD,min
GateB
GateD,max
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Defining the gate
If the right to advance policy proposals for a certain policy area is given to a specific poli-
tician or group of politicians (e.g. a parliamentary committee) then these actors are said to
be gate keepers for this policy area. Policy proposals will not be advanced by a gate keeper
under circumstances described in the next paragraphs with consequences for bureaucratic
room to manoeuvre similar to the consequences of the core.
The right to advance a proposal may be codified by rules defining (agenda setting) juris-
dictions but it may as well be a customary law that players who are actually dealing with a
given policy field (the respective committees etc.) act as agenda setters in the field of their
interest. Although, without formal restrictions it is always possible that some other politi-
cian or group advances a proposal in a field they are not responsible for, it seems save to
assume that for most policies, the division of labour in parliament or in government has as
one result the existence of effective gate keepers.
Hammond and Knott assume that politicians are strictly risk averse. Strictly risk averse
politicians do only advance policy proposals when it is certain that, as a consequence of
their action, they can move a policy inside their preferred-to-set and thus increase their
utility. The preferred-to-set of a player is defined as the set of points of a (policy) space
that is closer to the player than the status quo, i.e. that is preferred by this player to the
status quo.
The gate of a strictly risk averse player acting under an open amendment rule is defined
as the set of policies that is closer or as close to this player then the most distant point of
the core. This can be explained as follows: With an open amendment rule policy proposals
have a tendency to move into the core, but it cannot be said in advance where inside the
core a proposal will be moved by amendments. Once a process is started the final decision
can therefore be at any point inside the core. When the status quo is closer to the player
than some points inside the core that implies that the final vote can as well be outside the
preferred-to-set of the respective player (Hammond/Knott 1996). The gate is therefore
defined as above. With complete risk aversion the gate is always bigger than the core.
Because policy proposals may move outside the preferred-to-set of the agenda setting
politician when the status quo is closer to this politician than at least some points inside the
core a risk averse politician will not advance a policy proposal when the status quo policy
is inside her gate. She will keep her gates to the agenda closed for this policy. GateB and
GateD,max in Figure 1 mark the gate of politician B and D respectively given the that the
core is between B and C.
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Note that gate and core are independent of the status quo, but that they are dependent of
preference configurations. Note in addition that the gates of different players are inde-
pendent of each other but not independent of the core.
The problem of risk-aversion
Let me elaborate on the problem of risk-aversion before continuing. As Hammond and
Knott point out the far bound of the core to a given player defines the width of her gate
when this politician is completely risk averse. However, it seems to be reasonable to con-
ceptualise risk aversion as continuous from completely risk averse to non risk averse.
Complete risk aversion would mean that the whole core will have to be a subset of the gate
as Hammond and Knott describe. But if risk aversion is not complete, one can argue that a
player will advance a policy proposal as soon as there is a certain likelihood, that the new
policy will be closer to her ideal point than the status quo. This likelihood is equivalent to
the share of the core that gate would have to cover. If, for example, a politician is risk
taking enough to advance policy proposals whenever there is at least a 50% chance to have
a favourable outcome (i.e. the new policy being inside her preferred-to-set) the gate of this
politician would only have to cover half the area taken up by the core.
The portion of the core that has to be covered by the gate is directly proportional to the
risk aversion of the player. The extreme positions are marked by the completely risk averse
player and the minimally or non-risk averse player. The characteristics of the former’s gate
have already been described. The gate of the latter would only extend to that point of the
border of the core least distant to the respective player. That means that a minimally risk
averse politician is willing to advance policy proposals whenever there is at least one point
inside the core that is closer to her than the status quo. The gates with minimum and
maximum risk aversion are illustrated in Figure 1 for player D with gateD,min and gateD,max
respectively. Note that with limited risk aversion, the gate may become smaller than the
core.
When there is an uneven number of veto players in a political system, and hence a point-
core, differences in risk aversion are without effect because the distant and the close border
of the core collapse into the ideal point of the median player. The width of the gate of any
given player is then defined by the distance of this player’s ideal point to the ideal point of
the median player. The actual width of the gate is twice this distance.
Even though I used a constellation of politicians to demonstrate the consequences of
limited risk aversion, in the remainder of the text the idea of limited risk aversion will only
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be used for bureaucrats under conditions to be described (section 2.2.3 below). For politi-
cians, I stick to the assumption of complete risk aversion for the sake of simplicity.
Implications of core and gate for the room to manoeuvre of the bureaucracy
The existence of a core has, according to Hammond and Knott (1996), the following con-
sequences for bureaucratic room to manoeuvre: the bureaucracy can move policy freely
across the policy space inside the core because there is no majority that is able to upset any
status quo inside the core by an alternative proposal.
With effective gate keepers, the gate has similar consequences for the discretionary
space of the bureaucracy as the core. The gate keeper will not advance a policy proposal
when the status quo is inside her gate. This does leave additional room in the policy space
to discretionary action by the bureaucracy because the gate is always bigger than the core.
These conclusions have to be differentiated, however, for decisions with and without
parliamentary involvement (laws and administrative decrees respectively) and for various
configurations of the actors.
For quasi-legislative measures like administrative decrees that do not necessitate parlia-
mentary involvement the question is whether the whole cabinet or the individual ministers
are policy-responsible.
With individual policy-responsibility by the respective minister, the core reduces to the
ideal point of the minister, hence there is no room to manoeuvre for the bureaucracy.
With collective responsibility, it depends on the number of ministers or likewise on the
number of parties in a coalition, whether there is a point-core or a bigger core. With an
even number of ministers or coalition parties the core will be stretching out between the
two median actors.
Additionally, with collective responsibility, the gate of the minister responsible for a
certain policy becomes important. The minister will not propose policy changes when the
status quo is located inside her gate. As a consequence, the discretionary freedom of the
bureaucracy may grow as well.
With collective cabinet responsibility, the strength of the Prime Minister may become
consequential as well, leading to a point core again, when the Prime Minister has a strong
position in the cabinet. But in order not to complicate things further, this will be left out of
consideration here, and the Prime Minister be assumed to be a perfect primus inter pares.
To summarise, under collective cabinet responsibility it is likely that there is more room
to manoeuvre for the bureaucracy than under individual policy responsibility. This conclu-
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sion is in line with the findings of Baylis (1989: 156) that strong bureaucracies do often go
together with collective cabinet decision-making.
Normal legislation with parliamentary involvement depends on (1) the type of parlia-
mentary support the government has, and (2) which core is responsible for bureaucratic
room to manoeuvre. If there is a majority government the relevant core is the majority
core, whereas with a minority government the relevant core is that of the whole house.
There are then the various possible combinations of number of veto players and parties
voting as unitary actors, in factions, or individually that define whether there is a point-
core or a core stretching between two median players with the respective consequences for
bureaucratic room to manoeuvre. For an extensive discussion of thinkable configurations
see Hammond and Butler (1996) and Hammond (1999).
To conclude this section, it can be said that the room to manoeuvre that may open up for
the bureaucracy as a consequence of the core and the gate is a function not only of the
preference configuration but of the type of legislation (law/decree), cabinet decision rule,
type of government, and the number of veto players. These characteristics define where the
relevant core and gates are.
2.2.3 Bureaucracies as stand-in agenda setters
The third type of bureaucratic influence on policy-making is that of agenda setting. The
general idea of bureaucracies as stand-in agenda setters is that politicians do not have the
time and resources to actively deal with all political problems that is to set the agenda for
all problems that may arise in a polity. It is the bureaucracy that can stand in here, take up
problems, and advance proposals for their solution, thereby becoming the agenda setter for
a certain policy.
When the bureaucracy becomes an agenda setter the additional question is whether it can
become an effective agenda setter. As effective agenda setter, I understand an actor, who
can not only put a proposal on the agenda but can also predefine the final decision out-
come.
Saliency of a policy problem
The room to manoeuvre that bureaucracies possess has been described with the concepts of
core and gate. In an ideal world this would suffice to completely describe the discretionary
leeway for bureaucracies, but the world of politics is, of course, not ideal. One of the major
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restrictions for politicians when they deal with policy problems is that they need
resources—especially people—to effectively be able to tackle a problem and advance a
proposal. In a situation where the resources available to politicians do not suffice to deal
with all problems at hand a criterion is needed to decide which policies to deal with, and in
which order.
A rational actor will deal with policy problems in order of their importance to her. I will
model this importance with the concept of saliency. Saliency is here understood as a com-
bination of the priority a given politician has for a certain policy, the clarity of the prefer-
ence she has about this policy, and the distance of the status quo of this policy from the
ideal point of the politician.
Priorities, preferences, location of status quo, and hence the distances between the status
quo and the ideal points of the politicians are given external to the model presented here. It
does not matter for the problem at hand where they come from, it is only important that
they are there and guide decision-making. The priority a politician gives to a certain policy
may be high or low, she may have clear or unclear preferences about the problem, and the
status quo of a policy can be close or distant to the ideal point of a politician. All three sali-
ency components are of course inherently continuous, but they will be considered as
dichotomous for the sake of clarity of the theoretical argument.
Table 1 gives an overview of the different combinations of the three components of sali-
ency. With dichotomous components saliency has an ordinal scale with “3” as the highest
value. This value marks the presence of high priority, clear preferences, and great distance
of the status quo from the ideal point of a politician. If one of these characteristics is lack-
ing the policy will be of medium-high saliency for a politician, marked by an entry of “2”
in Table 1. If only one characteristic is present then saliency will be rather low, signified
by an entry of “1”. At last when none of these characteristics is present, a policy problem
will be of no saliency to a given politician. The dotted lines in Table 1 divide the two
unequivocal combinations of characteristics from the ones with mixed characteristics.
Table 1: Saliency of Policy Problems to Politicians
Preferences
Priority Distance SQ-IP clear unclear
high 3 (high) 2
high
low 2 1
high 2 1
low
low 1 0 (low)
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The combination “priority high” and “preference unclear” may seem a bit odd. It can,
nevertheless, be plausible. Consider for example a newly emerging apparently urgent
policy problem. It may not be clear yet for politicians where they should stand on the issue,
but the problem could nevertheless be of high priority because some part of the electorate
really cares about this problem or because it is clearly visible that it must be dealt with for
the purpose of provision of a common good.
The consequences of the saliency of problems for bureaucratic agenda setting are
expressed in the following two propositions:
Proposition 1: Under conditions of limited resources, politicians decide which problems to
deal with (put them on the political agenda) by ordering problems according to their sali-
ency. A problem will be dealt with by a politician, when there are no unresolved problems
left that have higher saliency.
Proposition 2: When no politicians put a problem on the political agenda, bureaucracies
may under certain circumstances stand in as agenda setters.
Note that when bureaucracies act as agenda setters they do have a gate as well (gateBu). But
in contrast to the gates of politicians the core does only define the width of gateBu but is not
part of gateBu itself. The core is not subsumed into gateBu because, as Hammond and Knott
(1996) demonstrate, the policy space inside the core is the space, which a bureaucracy can
fill using its discretion (above p. 13). Therefore, whenever the status quo is inside the core
the bureaucracy will have the possibility of moving a policy to that border of the core clos-
est to its own ideal point without having to act as stand-in agenda setter. Furthermore,
since bureaucracy can always move a core policy to the border of the core closest to itself,
in the case of the bureaucracy it is the close rather than the distant border of the core which
defines the width of the bureaucracy’s gate.
Parliamentary chances to amend legislation and bureaucratic agenda-setting
It was said above that the size of the gate of an actor is a function of the risk aversion of
this actor in composition with the distance of this actor’s ideal point to the border of the
core. The likely risk aversion of the bureaucracy when trying to stand in as agenda setter
can, in large part, be explained by parliamentary chances to amend policy proposals put
before it for approval. The following paragraphs therefore contain a discussion of parlia-
mentary chances to amend and the likely consequences for the bureaucracy’s risk-aversion.
One way parliamentary chances to amend legislation may be limited are by formal
restrictions on parliamentary amendment rights and time. The more extensive the amend-
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ment rights and time granted to parliament are, the more risk averse the bureaucracy
should be, because extended amendment rights and extended time increase the chances that
parliamentary decision makers are able to move the proposal outside the preferred-to set of
the bureaucracy. The more limited parliament’s rights and time to amend are on the other
hand, the higher the chances for the bureaucracy to get its proposal through because the
parliament has only a few chances to have an impact on a policy proposal brought before
it.
Proposition 3: The more restricted amendment rights and elaboration time for the parlia-
ment are, the smaller the risk-aversion and as a consequence the gate of the bureaucracy,
and likewise the greater its chances to influence political decision-making by effectively
standing-in as an agenda setter.
Another factor influencing parliamentary willingness to amend legislation is the type of
government, conceptualised via the parliamentary base of the current government (sin-
gle/multi party majority, single/multi party minority).
The reliability of the parliamentary support for the government can be seen as a function
of the type of government. Laver and Schofield (1990: 150-155) present empirical
evidence supporting this argument. Reliability of parliamentary support decreases with the
increase in the number of coalition partners and as the size of the coalition moves away
from a close majority to either side—oversized majority or minority.
The more reliable the parliamentary support base of a given government, the less likely
is the parliament to amend government proposals brought to the chamber for approval. The
smaller the reliability of parliamentary support, the higher is the likelihood that parliament
will successfully try to amend policy proposals from the government. The decreased likeli-
hood of parliamentary amendments that is concomitant with a more stable basis of parlia-
mentary support of the government will in turn decrease the risk aversion of the bureauc-
racy, and again as a consequence of its gate, increase the chances of the bureaucracy to
stand in as agenda setter.
The comparatively strongest position of the bureaucracy can be expected in circum-
stances of a close single party majority as is usually the case in the United Kingdom where
the parliament almost is obliged to vote through government proposals in order not to
endanger its own power position. Circumstances like these leave the bureaucracy with the
only necessity to ensure that their proposal will pass cabinet. From there on, all later moves
can almost be taken for granted.
Proposition 4: The more reliable the parliamentary support base of the government, the
better are the chances for the bureaucracy to effectively stand in as agenda setter.
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Unclear preferences and the shape of the core
Neither priority nor distance of status quo to the ideal point of a politician has an impact on
core and gate (It could be argued that low priority of a policy increases the risk a politician
is willing to take and would thus decrease the politicians gate. This will not be explored
here because it would unnecessarily complicate the argument). The clarity of preferences,
however, is assumed to have an impact on the size of the gate as is demonstrated below.
Hammond’s and Knott’s core has clearly defined boundaries. Implicit here is the
assumption that politicians do have clear preferences about the policies involved, i.e. that
they do have an ideal point. If one relieves the assumption about exact preferences, it
becomes necessary to discuss what the core will look like under such circumstances.
With unclear preferences, actors know at best the range in which their preferences lie,
but they do not know their ideal point exactly. Actors will have to be seen as having an
ideal range rather than an ideal point. In this view, the existence of an ideal point is a
limiting case where the borders of a preference range collapse into one point—the ideal
point. With the idea of a preference range goes the assumption that an actor is indifferent
about all policies inside this preference range and will therefore abstain from all votes as
long as the status quo and the alternative are both inside her ideal range. This has important
implications for the characteristics of the core.
In Figure 2 the borders of the preference range of (the median players) B and C that are
pointing towards each other will be called “inner bounds” whereas the far borders will be
called “outer bounds.” The area between the inner bounds does have the classic character-
istics of the core (there classic core or coreC from now on): policies inside this coreC can-
not be overruled by any other policy in- or outside coreC. The two areas between the inner
and outer bounds do not share this characteristic. These areas will be called weak core
(coreW, and since there are two such weak cores differentiated into coreW,B and coreW,C).
Any policy status quo inside coreW,B can be overruled by a policy between the inner bound
of B’s ideal range and this status quo. The same is true for C respectively.
The classic and the weak cores together form the total core which I shall refer to as
coreT.
Note that it is still not possible to move a policy status quo that is inside the core (either
weak or classic) outside it. Likewise, a policy inside either weak core cannot be overruled
by a policy alternative in coreC. Such a policy can, at most, be moved to the border
between the weak and the classic core. A policy can only be moved into the classic core,
when the status quo is outside the ideal range of any of the median players, that is outside
coreT.
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Consider for example a policy status quo inside the ideal range of B (IRB in Figure 2).
Since B is indifferent about all policies inside IRB, she would abstain from a vote as long
as the alternative proposal is inside IRB as well. Since C would only vote for policies that
are closer to her ideal range then the status quo there would be a majority for all policy
alternatives between status quo and the inner bound of IRB.
Figure 2: Unclear Preferences, Ideal Range, Weak and Classic Core
IRCIRB
A B C D
CW, B CW, C
Cc
CT
When the inner bounds of the preference ranges of the median players overlap, the classic
core disappears. The core left has only the characteristics of a weak core. There will be no
unbeatable policies any longer, but policies inside the coreT are still unbeatable by policies
outside it.
With only one median player and unclear preferences the situation is different. To begin
with there is no core with one median player with clear preferences and hence an ideal
point as stated above (p. 10).
With unclear preferences, however, the ideal range of the median player (IRmedian player)
becomes the core of this configuration with the known characteristics that a policy status
quo inside her ideal range could not be upset by any other policy.
The mechanics are clear for the case, where either policy status quo or policy alternative
are inside the ideal range of the median player and the other is outside and vice versa.
The interesting case is when policy status quo and an alternative proposal are both inside
the IRmedian player. In this situation the median player will abstain from a vote, and hence the
remaining number of voting politicians is even. This puts the players left and right of the
(now silent) median player into the positions of median players. The invulnerability of the
points inside the ideal range of the true median player remains unchanged, however,
because the area between the two (new) median players has now the characteristics of a
core. A policy status quo inside this new core will likewise be invulnerable to any other
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policy proposal. Therefore, with only one median player and unclear preferences IRmedian
player becomes the core of such a configuration.
The following Figure 3 demonstrates what these new elements of the model mean for
bureaucratic participation in the policy process. Here we have an odd number of players
with C being the median player.
Figure 3: Room to Manoeuvre for the Bureaucracy as a Consequence of Unclear
Preferences of Political Actors.
IRE
IRD
IRC
IRB
SQ
IRA
A B C
Alt1 Alt2
D Bu E
IR ideal range
SQ status quo
Bu Bureaucracy
Alt1 Alternative 1, when Politicians have ideal points
Alt2 Alternative 2, when Politicians have ideal ranges
When the players in this example have ideal points, the closest an agenda-setting bureau-
cracy can get a proposal to its own ideal point is C (alternative 1 in Figure 3). In the case
that politicians have more unspecific preferences and hence ideal ranges, bureaucracy can
place a proposal at alternative 2 and this proposal will still be passed by the political body
(parliament or cabinet) voting on it. If the ideal ranges of C and D would stretch so far as
to include the ideal point of the bureaucracy, then a bureaucracy could even move policy to
its own ideal point.
If preferences are extremely unclear then the ideal range of most politicians may stretch
across large areas of a policy dimension such that it is likely that there will be no effective
core at all. Under such circumstances, bureaucrats are free to move policy to almost every
point in the policy space without having to fear political intervention. Likewise, the risk
aversion of bureaucrats would decrease with increasingly unclear preferences of politi-
cians. Bureaucrats could become ever more willing to table policy proposals of their own,
hoping that they will be able to get them through and bring the finally approved policy
close to their own ideal point. In other words, increasingly unclear preferences of politi-
cians are likely to decrease the size of the bureaucratic gate.
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Saliency, resources, and agenda setting bureaucracies
Let me now turn to a description of the various constellations between bureaucracy and
politicians which define whether a bureaucracy will have the chance to act as an agenda
setter or not. There are general rules for political and bureaucratic actors when they will
“move,” that is when they will try to advance a policy proposal.
Proposition 5: Politicians will advance a policy proposal when:
a) they are responsible for a certain policy for which they are the gate keepers,
b) and the status quo is outside their gate,
c) and there are no policy problems with higher saliency they haven’t been dealing with
yet,
d) and they still have resources available to deal with the problem.
To make a structured presentation of the following ideas possible I assume that there will always be
resources available for problems of saliency level 3. For medium saliency problems (saliency levels “2”
and “1”) a politician will advance a proposal according to availability of resources (cf. proposition 1).
Resources will never be sufficient and/or politicians are not interested to actively pursue low saliency
problems (saliency level 0).
Proposition 6: Bureaucrats move when:
a) no politician has moved,
b) and the status quo is outside the gate of the respective minister (the political principal
of the bureaucracy), or the minister does not have a gate for the respective policy
because she has no preferences related to this policy,
[Substantiation: Bureaucracy has no formal status allowing it to advance a policy proposal. A pro-
posal from the bureaucracy will always have to be tabled by the respective minister (or possibly
though unlikely another politician). If the status quo is inside the gate of the minister (gateMin) she is
not likely to table a proposal in cabinet. Since bureaucrats are assumed to be rational actors who do
only spent effort when there is a certain likelihood of success the above rule.
In the case of no preferences and hence no gateMin a minister is assumed to table a proposal from the
bureaucracy because there is no cost for this action to the minister but she can demonstrate activity to
the public and do something the bureaucracy will be pleased with. Since the minister has to rely on
the bureaucracy for most activities the latter can be seen as a sufficiently high incentive for the
minister to table the proposal.
There may, of course, be another minister or political player who is willing to sponsor a policy pro-
posal from the bureaucracy into the policy process. This case is very unlikely on the other hand and
will therefore not be explored further.]
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c) and the status quo is outside gateBu (or there is no gateBu for reasons explained
below).
Table 2 is a complete listing of the various constellations that result as a consequence of
different levels of saliency and different positions of the status quo in relation to gateminister,
core, and gateBu. Note that according to Proposition 5 a policy proposal can be advanced
by politicians in general or by the politician (minister) leading a particular bureaucracy
(department). Whenever a politician does not take the initiative on a matter, the bureau-
cracy can move, as stated according to the rules in Proposition 6. This possibility to move
is established independently of the reasons politicians had for not acting on a matter.
Whether bureaucrats do actually want to advance a proposal depends on their relationship
to the status quo and on the gate of their principal (minister).
GateMin referred to at the top of Table 2 is the gate of the bureaucracy’s principal. The
core in the table is the majority core. In case of minority governments, this implies that
opposition parties have their share in defining the core.
When saliency is high and a policy is outside the gate of the principal, then the principal
will start herself to advance a policy proposal (and be it be by asking her bureaucrats to
write it up). In this case, bureaucracy has no chance of becoming an effective agenda setter
and can only use structures to co-define outcomes as outlined above. If saliency is high but
status quo is inside gateMin, the politician will not move. Even if no other politician is
advancing a proposal, the bureaucracy, under these circumstances, does not have an incen-
tive to become active because the principal is very unlikely to submit a proposal to the
cabinet. When status quo is located inside the core, no politician has any incentive to
advance a proposal. But, according to Hammond’s and Knott’s argument (1996) the
bureaucracy has discretionary leeway, and is therefore likely to use discretion instead of
advancing a new policy proposal.
The other extreme to the situation just described is that of Zero-Saliency. According to
Table 1 and Proposition 5, politicians neither have preferences to guide their action nor do
they have resources to act on these problems. The latter point implies that bureaucrats do
always have the chance to move on issues with low saliency, the former point (no or
extremely unclear preferences) implies that they will always advance proposals under these
circumstances unless the status quo is very close to or at their own ideal point.
To summarise, it can be said that in the two extremes the bureaucracy has either no
chance of becoming an agenda setter or has all the chances.
With the intermediate saliency levels things become more complicated. Politicians
(either the minister or any other politician) become decreasingly likely to advance policy
proposals with decreasing levels of saliency. This is signified by the “Move 2/3” and
“Move 1/3” entries for saliency levels “2” and “1” in Table 2. This decreasing likelihood is
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a function of the limited resources politicians have which forces them to concentrate their
attention on matters of high importance to them. If the status quo is outside gateMin and
none of the politicians move, the bureaucracy will advance a policy proposal if the status
quo is not inside gateBu.
When the saliency decreases and a policy status quo is located inside gateMin, it still
holds that the bureaucracy is not likely to advance policy proposals because of the limited
chances that the minister is taking the proposition to cabinet. Note, however, that with
decreasing saliency, unclear preferences become more likely with consequences for the
minister’s gate. The gate of the minister disappears when her ideal range covers the whole
core. A status quo that would be inside gateMin with clearer preferences (Table 2, column
B) would move into column A (status quo outside gateMin). This move stands for increased
possibilities for the bureaucracy to influence policy with decreasing levels of preference
clarity. In this situation a minister would be willing to advance a proposal from the ranks
of the bureaucracy because it does hot harm her utility in the policy sphere, pleases the
bureaucrats, and therefore earns her better standing with the bureaucrats.
Table 2: Room to Manoeuvre of Bureaucracy as a Function of Saliency Level of a Policy
Saliency A - SQ ∉ gateMin * B - SQ ∈ gateMin ** C - SQ ∈ core ***
3 Politicians Move do not move do not move
Bureaucrats - do not move use discretion
2 Politicians Move 2/3 asf(resources) do not move do not move
Bureaucrats Move if P does not
and SQ ∉ gateBu do not move use discretion
1 Politicians Move 1/3 asf(resources) do not move do not move
Bureaucrats Move if P does not
and SQ ∉ gateBu do not move use discretion
0 **** Politicians does not move - -
Bureaucrats do not move if SQ =IPBu
do not move if SQ =
IPBu
do not move if SQ =
IPBu
* GateMin is the gate of the respective minister (the principal of the bureaucracy).
** Principal does not move but some other politician may move. In the latter case bureaucracy can
always try to use organisational structures to influence policy decisions.
*** None of the politicians will move.
**** According to the reasoning outlined above it is assumed that there is no core and no gateP in this
constellation because preferences are unclear (which is here equated to non-existent preferences)
and priority is low. Therefore, every SQ ∉ gate and every SQ ∉ core, and hence bureaucracy does
always move (unless SQ = IPB).
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By being the prime mover, a bureaucracy can table a proposal that would move the policy
towards its own ideal point. The smaller the saliency of the problem for any politician and
the smaller the resources for the politicians the higher the bureaucracy’s chances to actu-
ally get a policy decision according to the initial proposal. The resource argument is valid
because politicians with already small resources can be assumed to put as many resources
as possible into active policy-making themselves. After this is done, there are only few if
any resources left to deal with additional projects such as writing up amendments to policy
initiatives from other actors. It needs to be noted here, that according to Figure 2, it is
increasingly likely that gateBu becomes smaller when the saliency of a policy decreases. If
the saliency is “1” then only one of the three conditions of priority, distance, and prefer-
ence clarity can be present. Unclear preferences are very likely under this circumstances. It
is these unclear preferences that can decrease the size of the bureaucratic gate because the
risk goes down that politicians will effectively intervene with a bureaucratic policy pro-
posal.
If the status quo policy is in the core, bureaucrats will again, as above, use discretion to
influence policy.
The three types of bureaucratic impact on policy-making that were discussed in this
chapter are implicitly structuring Table 2: whenever bureaucracy cannot (Cell A3) or does
not move (cells B3-B1) or does only have a certain likelihood to move (cells A2-A1), and
cannot use discretion, it is likely to use organisational structures to influence decision-
making (cf. section 2.2.1). When the status quo is inside the majority core (cells C3–C1)
bureaucracy will try to use its discretion, and in the remainder of combinations, (cells A0-
C0, and with a certain likelihood A1, A2) is it likely that the bureaucracy will try to
become a stand-in agenda setter if the status quo is not at its own ideal point.
2.3 Summary of the theoretical discussion
To this point a theoretical framework has been established within which the question of
structural conditions of bureaucratic influence on policy-making can be further analysed. I
have outlined three different types of bureaucratic influence on policy-making. The first
was the structurally defined possibility of influencing the content of policy decisions that
are already on their way through the organisational structures dealing with the law making
process. The second was the chance to influence policies when politicians are not able to
find majorities against what the bureaucracy is doing, i.e. bureaucracy is using the core of
the preference configuration to exert discretion. The size of the core is defined by the num-
ber of veto players and the ideological spread of the veto players, especially the median
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players. The third possibility, that was newly developed in this article, is the chance for the
bureaucracy to effectively stand in as agenda setter. This chance is for the most part
defined by the information processing resources of the political actors relative to those of
the bureaucracy.
Table 3 is a summary of the discussion with the intention of providing a general over-
view of characteristics under which one can expect a strong national bureaucracy and
under which this bureaucracy will be better checked by parliament as well as the cabinet.
The strength of the bureaucracy is positively related to its own resources and ability to
act homogeneously. It is inversely related to the resources of the political players. The
concept “resources” in this usage does not only count those resources that have an impact
on the level of saliency (viz. resources needed to process information), but also includes
chances to influence policy (e.g. amendment rights) and the unity of the political actors as
well.
Table 3: Summary: Expected Strength of Bureaucratic Impact on Policy-Making as a
Function of Resource Differences and Bureaucratic Structures
Resources of parliament and cabinet in relation to the bureaucracy
poor (+) rich (-)
Homogeneity of veto players
weak (+) strong (-) weak (+) strong (-)
strong (+) + + + (3) + + - (2) + - + (2) + - - (1)Ability to use org.
structure to strength-
en position weak (-) - + + (2) - + - (2) - - + (1) - - - (0)
(+) and (-) mark whether this value is enhancing (+) or decreasing (-) expected strength of the bureaucracy.
As an illustration of the meaning of the cells in Table 3 I take the two extreme points of the
table. When the organisational structures of the bureaucracy support its ability to influence
policy proposals, the veto and preference configuration leaves it much room to manoeuvre,
and its resources are strong in comparison to parliament and cabinet, so that it will have
many chances to stand in as agenda setter, then the bureaucracy is likely to have a strong
position in national policy-making. This is symbolised by the three plus-signs in this cell.
In the opposite extreme, bureaucracy will be in a comparatively weak position as
symbolised by the three minus-signs.
Formal theorists do usually advance their topics by extensively modelling preference
configurations and deriving conclusions from these models. The framework proposed here
is slightly more complex in so far as it includes a number of additional traits that are to
model the environment within which the preferences form and become effective.
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Therefore, I am going to look at structural features that enhance or decrease a
bureaucracies ability to become an effective agenda setter or a successful user of structures
to influence policy. A number of organisational and institutional elements with such effects
have already been pointed to in the above sections. In the next part of the text I will outline
these characteristics in more detail to present a set of empirical indicators that can measure
potential bureaucratic influence.
3 Operationalisation
It has been deplored time and again that bureaucracies do not lend themselves easily to
comparative and quantitative analysis. Caveats have been expressed about the usability of
putatively comparative information. Peters (1996: 23) writes of the “travelling problem” of
concepts and data definitions across time and space that makes comparison so difficult in
the field of public administration. Nevertheless, careful use of the available data has been
accepted, because there is no better way of developing good comparative indicators than
by simply starting somewhere and gradually improving on the initial quality of the data
(McGregor and Solano 1996). The empirical data for comparison needs to be collected
with the highest possible care, but with the recognition of the unavoidable risk of making
inaccurate descriptions and comparisons.
One of the initial problems of every empirical analysis is the plausible operationalisation
and measurement of indicators. Due to the situation of comparative quantitative
administrative research just described, the problem is not yet well discussed in the litera-
ture. This chapter is therefore devoted to the task of a detailed description and substantia-
tion of the indicators to be used, thus hopefully inviting a critical debate on the operation-
alisation put forward here.
The indicators will be presented in three groups. According to the structure of the theo-
retical argumentation, there will first be indicators describing the ability of bureaucracies
to use organisational structures strategically to influence decision outcomes. Indicators in
this group capture aspects of homogeneity of the bureaucratic personnel as well as the pos-
sibilities of politicians to define what decision proposals evolve through the ranks of the
bureaucracy by placing people of their choice and trust into the ranks of the bureaucracy.
The indicators in the second group describe the institutional configuration that provides
the framework within which preferences form a core and gates which in turn defines the
room to manoeuvre for the bureaucracy.
The third group consists of indicators capturing the ability of the bureaucracy to stand in
as agenda setter.
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For each indicator a short explanation is given why this indicator is thought to be a
reasonable construct, then the details of its construction and data source are reported.
When the relative ability of an actor is to be expressed, like the relative strength of the
bureaucracy in relation to cabinet and parliament, one would expect symmetrical indica-
tors, i.e. indicators of the same type for the administrative as well as political actors (see
e.g. staff size). Yet, there are some indicators that are non-symmetrical. In this case,
explicit mention is made why and how the characteristic thus indicated is thought to have
an impact on the bureaucracies ability to influence policy decision-making nevertheless.
3.1 Indicators capturing the bureaucracy’s ability to influence decision-making
through the strategic use of organisational structures
The following list contains structural characteristics that define the chances of the bureau-
cracy to use organisational structures as devices to influence political decision-making.
From the view point of the politicians, these characteristics do inversely indicate their
chances to have their preferences heeded as early in the administrative process of decision
preparation as possible.
3.1.1 Openness of the civil service recruitment and career system
Openness of the civil service recruitment and career system is included as a proxy for the
homogeneity of the civil service bureaucracy. Homogeneity of the civil service is inversely
related to the ministers ability to lead a department as will be argued below. Openness and
homogeneity are related to each other via the process of socialisation into a civil service
job. The more open the recruitment structures, that is the more there are chances for lateral
entry, entrants from different educational backgrounds, etc., the worse are the chances for
the development of and the socialisation into a common and homogenous civil service
culture and understanding. Homogeneity is inversely related to the minister’s ability to
lead a department because:
1. It supports the maximisation of the knowledge differential between bureaucracies and
their political superiors, because it provides structural elements supporting the transfer
of expertise to and keeping it with the civil servants. Homogeneity enhances the poten-
tial for inner service co-ordination and informal exchange of information through long
established networks between civil servants.
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2. A homogenous service is more likely to develop a common interest that is clearly
defined and understood by the members. The development of the civil service into a
special interest group itself (Hojnacki 1996: 159) is thus made easier. Under such
circumstances, a more homogenous civil service can be expected to lead not only to
more group self-consciousness but to an increased potential to act collectively accord-
ing to the perceived common interest on the basis of shared values and attitudes.
3. A homogenous civil service improves the conditions for bureaucrats to use organisa-
tional structures to influence the departmental decision process in their interest.
The ability of civil servants to use structures in this way depends on their ability to act
strategically. Strategic action is only possible with the ability to “predict” likely
choices of other servants and politicians at the same or later stages of a decision pro-
cess. A homogenous civil service does increase the chances to acquire this knowledge
about the preferences of other players. Additionally, there are more chances for colle-
gial interaction over time as well as an increased likelihood for more homogenous
preferences among civil servants with a homogenous civil service. There is even the
chance to develop relationships between civil servants that allow co-operative action in
decision processes. As a result, civil servants will be able more often to advance con-
sensual proposals to their minister. Since ministers do have only limited time resources
to deal with departmental affairs, they will usually revert to Management by Exception
(above p.8). Bringing consensual proposals before their ministers increases the chances
of the bureaucracy to have their proposals passed by the minister without interference.
This, in turn, means that a more homogenous civil service provides good conditions for
bureaucrats to successfully use organisational structures as devices to influence
decision outcomes.
Open career systems are characterised by good possibilities for lateral entry, a weak
emphasis on career development, and no specific labour relations in the public sector
through special civil service employment statutes. Data for this indicator is mainly based
on Auer, Demmke, and Polet (1996).
The indicator is an additive index summarising a number of characteristics of the civil
service career system. These characteristics are recruitment procedures (entry conditions,
centrality/non-centrality, publicity of job advertisements etc.), remuneration schemes, the
rules for internal job advancement, and the legal basis for public employment (public
sector statutes or general labour law). Details are available from Table 15 in the Appendix.
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3.1.2 Openness of the recruitment system for top positions in the administration
(Senior Executive Service)
The general explanation for this indicator is as above. The top administrative levels need
special mention because most countries do have or did recently develop an explicit senior
executive service system (SES) with specific recruitment and career rules for this group
that differ from those for the general civil service.
The major source of information here are two reports on SES-systems from the OECD
(1997) and the European Institute for Public Administration (EIPA 1998). Details are
available from Table 16 in the Appendix.
3.1.3 Formal politicisation of the SES
Formal politicisation of the SES means the possibility for the government of the day, or its
ministers, to pick their top bureaucrats at will without major procedural obstacles. Formal
politicisation can help to ensure that the ministerial apparatus is more closely responsive to
the political ideas of the government and to tighten the grip of the minister on the
ministerial apparatus (Derlien 1996; Mayntz and Derlien 1989; Bureau voor de Algemen
Bestuursdienst 1998). Germany with its “politische Beamte” (political civil servants) in the
top levels of the ministries is a good example for such a system. Because such a system can
decrease the chances of the career civil service to influence policy decisions via strategic
use of organisational structures, politicisation is included as a relevant indicator (see above
p.7).
There is of course a trade-off between the necessary institutional memory and the wish
of the minister to have as many political trustees as possible in the department. The discus-
sion about the right amount of politically loyal ministerial servants is beset with many
normative as well as empirical questions. They need not concern us here, however, because
this article is only recording current conditions and not trying to give advice on how to
structure civil service systems.
Formal politicisation of the SES measures the ability of the government or minister
respectively to “hire and fire” senior servants at their discretion and the extent to which a
minister is involved in picking her top servants. The data sources are OECD (1997) and
EIPA (1998) as above. Details are available from Table 16 in the Appendix.
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3.1.4 Amount of political activity allowed to civil servants
The amount of political activity allowed to civil servants can be seen as a proxy for the
preparedness of civil service to use structures to strategically influence decision-making
against the known preferences of the minister. The reasoning is as follows: Official prohi-
bition of political activity supports the establishment of a culture of aversion towards poli-
tics in the service. At the same time a culture of neutrality of the service against political
ambition may develop. The British civil service is a good example here. A liberal policy in
contrast, makes it more likely for civil servants to actually have palpable political convic-
tions and to perceive it as legitimate to carry these convictions with them to their adminis-
trative job (Peters 1995: 34). Under these latter circumstances civil servants may feel much
more tempted to use the sequence of organisational decision-making to strategically influ-
ence final decision outcomes. This justifies the use of “allowed political” activity in the
given context.
The political activity indicator is composed of four items making statements about the
possibility of engaging in political activities from the party level to active participation in
elections. The data sources are as above. Details are available from Table 16 in the Appen-
dix.
3.2 Indicators to form expectations about the size of core and gates
3.2.1 Number of veto players
The number of veto players is the basic institutional variable for the definition of the
bureaucratic room to manoeuvre as was argued above p. 9 ff.
To keep matters more simple I will in the interpretation differentiate between constella-
tions with one veto player (and hence no core) and multiple veto players only. Even
though, according to the model, there will be no core with any odd number of veto players
as well, it can be expected that room to manoeuvre for the bureaucracy will increase with a
combined principal nevertheless. The desirable more detailed differentiation of number of
veto players will have to be left to later analysis, when closer attention can be paid to the
characteristics of the specific situation in the countries.
The indicator counts partisan as well as institutional veto players if the latter do not fall
under the absorption rule, which states, that institutional veto players are counted only
when their ideological position differs significantly from the partisan veto players in par-
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liament (Tsebelis 1995: 305-310). Data are from Tsebelis 2000. Data on the USA are by
analogy of usage from Hammond and Knott 1996.
3.2.2 Organisation of cabinet decision-making (responsibility)
This indicator is intended to grasp cabinet’s role in the policy game. Cabinet decision-
making can be organised with collective and individual policy responsibility by the minis-
ters. The type of organisation has consequences for the size of the cabinet core as was
argued above.
The cabinet collectivity indicator combines information from several sources, compara-
tive as well as single country descriptions. Data are from Andeweg and Galen 1993, Baylis
1989, Döring 1993, Müller 1992, and OECD 1992.
3.3 Indicators for the chances of the bureaucracy to become an effective agenda
setter
3.3.1 The resource base of parliament
Size of parliamentary staff, ministerial staff, and its relation
Ministerial staff measures the major resource, civil service staff, of the ministerial admin-
istration. It is given in two figures, one only including core ministerial staff and the other
covering core plus implementation agency staff. Because, from the OECD-data, it was not
possible to differentiate between ministerial and non-ministerial, that is independent,
implementation agencies information on existence or non-existence of independent imple-
mentation agencies is included. Ministerial resources are comparatively smaller with inde-
pendent implementation agencies. To correct for this inaccuracy information on existence
or non-existence of independent implementation agencies is included. There are, of course,
special control problems with independent agencies (Hammond/Knott 1996, Polidano
1999), but these problems are not discussed here.
Defence administration and military personnel was generally excluded from the count
because it proved difficult in a number of cases to distinguish personnel on active military
duty from the staff of the defence administration. By completely leaving out the defence
sector an undue inflation of the numbers for the ministerial administration was avoided.
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The data are based on OECD (1992, 1993s and 1995s). Details are available from Table
15 and Table 17 in the Appendix.
The amount of parliamentary staff serves as an indicator of parliament’s ability not only
to process the information provided by the government bureaucracy but to develop its own
basis of expertise. An adequate amount of staff can support parliament in the formation of
preferences and the active development of its own policy proposals, so that less chances
are left to the bureaucracy for agenda-setting activities. Without an adequate amount of
support and research personnel there will be limited chances only for the parliament to
keep up with the bureaucracies speed of bringing up and processing issues. Data on par-
liamentary staff are obtained from either OECD (1992, 1993s, and 1995s) or directly from
the national parliaments. See Appendix Table 183. Parliamentary and ministerial staff are
reported in absolute as well as relative numbers.
It is not clear yet, whether the absolute or the relative size indicators are the more appro-
priate ones. An unambiguous theoretic derivation has not succeeded yet. Whereas the
former give an impression of the absolute size of the central government machinery the
later seem to be more appropriate to judge the difference in resources between parliament
and the executive. But these relative numbers do still need the comparative context to
become meaningful, because there is no standard informing us how much parliamentary
staff is needed as an equivalent for a given number of government bureaucrats. The state-
ments that are possible with these data are therefore statements about the relative wealth of
parliamentary resources in the observed countries in relation to each other.
Eventually, whether absolute or relative numbers are taken does only make a serious dif-
ference to the rank order of countries in the case of Japan. Japan has a very big parliamen-
tary apparatus and is therefore second in the rank order of absolute staff numbers (cf. Table
7). But this high absolute number of parliamentary staff is heavily outnumbered by an even
bigger ministerial administration such that Japan ranks among the bottom quarter in rela-
tive numbers.
                                                
3 A research group at the Social Science Research Center Berlin, consisting of Achim Kielhorn, Bernhard
Wessels and the author was carrying out a research project “Parliamentary Structures and Parliamentary
Resources” including a mail questionnaire that was sent to the speakers or presidents of the EU-member
states, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the USA in July 1999. It contained
questions about the committee system, committee staff, and general parliamentary staff. The questions
covered the period from 1970 to date. 16 of the 21 parliaments have answered to the questionnaire.
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System of permanent parliamentary committees
The differentiation of parliament into permanent committees is not in the strict sense a
resource but its effects are similar. Committee differentiation clearly designates areas of
policy responsibility to individual parliamentarians. This division of labour can support the
development of clear preferences on the limited number of issues a particular committee
has to deal with. In the end this can help to increase the average level of saliency that poli-
cies have for parliamentary politicians. A similar argument for the effect of committees on
the ability of parliament to control the executive and be an effective part of the national
polity can be found in Mattson and Strøm (1995) and Strøm (1998a). In addition, if com-
mittees are structured along ministerial jurisdictions it is less likely that there will be
uncovered policy space left, where bureaucrats may feel a need to step in because nobody
else is going to deal with an issue.
The indicator is provided as the average number of committees per decade. Information
is taken from the research project “Parliamentary Structures and Parliamentary Resources”
mentioned above.
Time to process information
Another important resource for parliament is its time to process government information.
Parliament does only have limited chances to digest government proposals and substan-
tively act upon them without a sufficient amount of time to do this job.
Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to gather comparative information about the
time the parliament gets to deal with policy proposals in general, time to deal with the gov-
ernment’s budget is taken as general representation for parliamentary reaction time. Budget
time seems to be an appropriate indicator, because differences in budgeting time for the
government administration and the parliament are not only clearly visible but formally
fixed as well. Additionally, this information is available on a comparative basis.
Data sources for time to process the budget proposal are OECD (1987) and Hagen and
Harden (1992). For details see Table 18 in the Appendix.
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Formal rights of parliament in the legislative process
There are a number of formal rights that have an impact on the chances of the various
actors in a national polity to become agenda setters.
The first indicator describes the distribution of rights to initiate legislation between
parliament and the executive. The indicator summarises which parliamentary actors
(members, groups, committees) have the right to initiate legislation. In addition it is
considered whether the electorate has the right to initiate legislation, because popular
initiative as well takes chances to initiate from the executive and thus the bureaucracy. As
elements positively influencing the executive’s rights to initiation are included whether
there is a budget prerogative for the government, and whether there is a quorum on
initiatives from members of the house. Details on indicator construction can be obtained
from Table 18 in the Appendix. The data are based on IPU (1986: Table 29, p.859 ff.).
The second indicator describes to what extent the executive is able to legislate without
parliament. The indicator has two elements. The first captures how restrictive the possi-
bilities are to delegate legislative authority to the cabinet, and the second element captures
to what extent parliamentary approval of executive legislation is needed. The data is based
on IPU (1986: Table 35, p.1027 ff.). Details on the operationalisation are given in Table 18
in the Appendix.
The third indicator with regard to the organisation of the legislative process describes the
role of committees in the way parliaments deal with government drafts of legislation. It
was said above that strong committees are expected to strengthen the general position of
parliament. Committees, however, can only have a positive effect for parliament, when
they are formally granted standing in the legislative process. This indicator captures there-
fore, whether the committee stage is compulsory on the way of a government proposal to
the final vote, in which way the committee amendments are considered during the readings
of the whole house, and whether government or single ministers have a right to interfere
into the way committees deal with their proposals. Especially the last right strengthens the
position of a minister and the bureaucracy behind her. When the consent of the minister is
required, before committee amendments are allowed to be put before the whole house, the
minister has ultimate agenda and outcome control. When there is close rapport between the
bureaucracy in a given department and the minister this implies, that the chances for the
bureaucracy to effectively set the agenda are considerably increased. Data for this indicator
is based on IPU (1986: Table 33, p.961 ff.). Details on the operationalisation are given in
Table 18 in the Appendix.
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Parliamentary information rights towards the executive
The ability of parliament to limit the room to manoeuvre for the bureaucracy does in addi-
tion to the availability of resources and its formal rights in the legislative process depend
on parliamentary rights of information, that is parliament’s rights of access to official
documents, its ability to summon witness, and its right to interrogate ministers and other
officials (Peters 1991). Open access to information supports the development of clear pref-
erences in parliament. Without proper knowledge of problems and possible solutions,
which often is only available through government bureaucracies, it will often be very diffi-
cult, or even impossible, for politicians to develop clear preferences on an issue. By in-
creasing the likelihood of the existence of clear preferences, an open access to government
information decreases the room to manoeuvre that parliaments have to leave to bureau-
cracies.
The indicator “information rights of parliament” is constructed as a summary indicator
on a number of information rights as described in IPU (1986; Peters 1991 used a very
similar approach with the IPU-data to capture parliament’s ability in relation to the bureau-
cracy). The index cannot be carried over to other time periods. There is no reliable data
source providing comparative information against which to check for changes in the rules
over time. Neither are changes reported in the IPU report itself. The IPU-data is therefore
taken as valid for the 1980s only. Details on indicator composition are available from
Table 18 in the Appendix.
A direct mirror of parliamentary information rights at the side of the bureaucracy would
be an indicator on the extent to which it is allowed administrations to actively conceal in-
formation from parliament (through devices like the former British Official Secrets Act).
Since this information is captured ex negativo in the IPU-Data it was not collected and
presented here separately.
3.3.2 The resource base of cabinet
Formal resources of the cabinet have been described in the above section already with
rights to initiate legislation and legislate without parliament in certain circumstances.
These formal resources describe the relationship between parliament and cabinet that has
an effect on the chances for the bureaucracy to become an agenda setter. But, the same
question of human resources in relation to the bureaucracy, that provided the rational for
the inclusion of the size of parliamentary staff, applies to the size of cabinet and supportive
positions as well. By supportive positions I mean any kind of additional partisan posts in
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the vicinity of cabinet like the British junior ministers or the German “Parlamentarische
Staatssekretäre” (parliamentary state secretaries). The larger the so defined resources of
cabinet the higher its chances to keep bureaucrats from setting the agenda. Indicators
describing this relationship are introduced here.
The rational for this indicator is similar to that for parliaments work capacity in relation
to the bureaucracy. Additional political personal increases the work capacity of non-bu-
reaucratic actors (Olson 1983: 97-99), so that there are less chances for the bureaucracy to
step in as an agenda setter. In the language of chapter 2.2 this means that the saliency level
for a number of policies can be raised, because the total span of attention of political
executive personal is increased. It plays an important role for the effects of additional par-
tisan posts whether these enjoy policy responsibility of their own because such a spread of
responsibility does especially serve the function of putting more eyes into the task of
monitoring and guiding bureaucratic activities.
Note that preference configurations are not affected by these structural traits. The effect
can at most be a change in saliency levels of certain policy problems as said above.
Data for cabinet size is taken from Woldendorp et al. (1993 and 1998). Information on
existence and responsibilities of junior ministers and functional equivalents are from
OECD (1992).
The size measures for cabinet are set in relation to the size measures for the SES-group
as the direct opposite numbers of the executive leaders in the ranks of the bureaucracy.
Information on the size of the SES-group is from EIPA (1998) and OECD (1997). Details
are available from Table 16 and Table 18 in the Appendix.
3.4 Other indicators
Link between interest groups and political as well as administrative actors
The last item used to describe availability of information as a resource is access to third
party information, especially to interest groups. It is an indicator that describes a resource
that can either belong to parliament, the executive and the bureaucracy, or both.
It is known that good governance is not possible without at least some co-operation with
and information from interest groups (Wilson 1990, chapter. 1; Page 1992, chapter 5).
Those actors in parliament or government to which interest groups mainly turn possess an
information advantage over other actors on societal problems as well as possible solutions
to these problems. This indicator therefore presents information on the main contact of
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interest groups in the political-administrative system. This main contact can be the minis-
ters, the bureaucracy, parliament or a combination thereof.
The complete coding scheme is outlined in Table 19 in the Appendix. The various
sources of data used for this indicator are listed there as well.
Parliamentary support of the incumbent government via Type of Government
Type of government gives information about the reliability of parliamentary support for the
government. It can be called a resource in relation to government as well, because the reli-
ability of the parliamentary support of government establishes the terms of interaction
between government and parliament. The reliability of parliamentary support goes down
with the increase in the number of coalition partners and as coalition size moves away
from a close majority to either side, oversized majority or minority. The less reliable par-
liamentary support the more likely it is that parliament will step in and try to amend policy
proposals from the government. This means for an initiative coming from the bureaucracy
that it is the more likely to pass the parliamentary stage without significant changes the
higher the reliability of the parliamentary majority. Under conditions of a high reliability of
parliament therefore, bureaucracy’s chances for effective agenda setting are increased.
Bureaucrats can be assumed to know when this is the case and when it is not and behave as
agenda setters accordingly.
Parliamentary support of the government is described with the indicator “Type of Gov-
ernment” that was published by Woldendorp et al. (1993 and 1998) and has since been
used in a number of comparative analyses. “Type of Government” captures the parliamen-
tary basis of government by coding it into six categories from single party majority to
minority coalition government. Single party majorities provide the highest chance for
reliable parliamentary support whereas minority coalitions provide the least chance for
reliable parliamentary support. Coding details are available from Table 19 in the Appendix.
After this discussion of the operationalisation I shall turn to a presentation of the data
itself, and to the development of a quantitatively grounded taxonomy of the position of
ministerial bureaucracies in national policy-making.
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4 Presentation of the Data
4.1 The bureaucracy’s ability to use organisational structures strategically
The first set of indicators to be presented are those describing the prerequisites for the
strategic use of organisational structures to influence policy-making. Table 4 displays the
openness or closeness of the general civil service recruitment and job advancement system.
It can be seen that countries are divided into one group with open and another group with
closed career systems with Japan and Norway being intermediary cases.
Table 4: Openness of the Civil Service Career System
(in descending order of values for the 1990s)
Country
N=17
Average 1970s Average 1980s Average 1990s Country Average
Greece 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0
Belgium 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
France 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6
Ireland 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2
Austria 5.2 5.2 4.9 5.1
Spain 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7
Portugal 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7
Germany 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7
Norway * n.a. n.a. 3.9 3.9
Japan * n.a. n.a. 3.4 3.4
Denmark 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Switzerland * n.a. 3.0 1.3 2.1
Italy 2.6 2.6 0.9 2.0
UK 2.1 2.1 0.9 1.7
Finland 1.3 1.3 0.6 1.1
Netherlands 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Sweden 0.9 0.8 0.0 0.5
Data from Auer, Demmke, and Polet 1996 passim. Data from a 14-item additive scale originally using 0-14
scale points. Data has been re-scaled to 0-6 scale points to facilitate comparability with SES-data (Table 5).
* Additional information on these countries from personal communication (see acknowledgements).
The open group includes most Scandinavian countries (except Norway, which is still close
to this group as an intermediary case), the Netherlands, the UK, and Italy. The closed
group is made up of continental European countries with Roman or German administrative
tradition. The exception is Ireland with a British tradition but a rather closed career system
as well.
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It is remarkable that the countries with rather closed career systems demonstrate a
considerable amount of stability in the character of their career systems, whereas the
countries who did already start out with rather open systems in the 1970s moved on to even
more open systems in the 1990s. Although it is not yet the time for causal conclusions, the
reader should keep in mind this circumstance when reading on. It could be seen as a first
hint that even if bureaucracy might not be capable of anything else it can at least defend its
own interests effectively.
The same criteria of openness and closeness can be looked at for the Senior Executive
Service (SES) as well. They need to be described separately, because for most countries
the recruitment system for the SES differs from the recruitment system generally applied in
the civil service (above p. 29). It can be seen from Table 5 that there is not as clear a divi-
sion between open and closed recruitment systems for the SES as there was for the civil
service in general. And whereas the possible spectrum of openness/closeness scores for the
civil service is exhausted (Table 4), the scores are all gathered towards the closed end of
the spectrum for the SES (Table 5). New Zealand which generally has a strong record of
civil service reform is the country with the most open civil service recruitment system.
This does also apply to its SES system. Comparatively open as well are the SES recruit-
ment systems in Norway, Belgium, Portugal, Austria, and Switzerland. Almost strictly
closed are, on the other hand, the SES recruitment systems in the Netherlands, Canada,
Australia, and the UK. Comparing this enumeration with the position of countries in Table
4 shows that for most countries where both information is available open SES recruitment
systems are coupled with closed civil service systems and vice versa. Switzerland where
both systems are rather open is an exception here.
Because the SES works so closely with the government minister it is not sufficient to
look just at the career systems, to be able to evaluate the potential influence senior civil
servants have when interacting with politicians. It is rather necessary to look at additional
features.
A very important aspect for the character of the minister–department relationship is the
question, whether ministers or the government have significant impact on choosing people
for top-SES positions as was argued above (p. 29). France, Germany, and Portugal are
those countries in the sample, where the political executive has the highest potential to fill
these top posts in their administration with like-minded people. There are still formal
restrictions as the high recruitment scores for France and Germany indicate, but from the
group of people who formally qualify through education and prior service for top positions
these three governments can most freely choose their civil service managers. The most
restricted systems are on the other hand found in Denmark, the UK, Austria, Belgium, and
the USA. These four countries have the lowest degree of formal politicisation of the higher
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ranks of the administration. Independent action possibilities of the civil service are likely to
be higher there as a consequence.
Table 5: Openness, Formal Politicisation, and Feasibility of Political Activity of Senior
Executive Service (SES)
(in descending order of summary score)
Country
N=18
recruitment formal
politicisation
political activity
score
Summary Score
6 = closed
recruitment
system
6 = low degree of
formal
politicisation
6 = no limits on
political activity
6 = strong
position in
policy-making.
Belgium 4.0 4 6 4.7
Austria 4.0 4 6 4.7
Netherlands 5.9 2 6 4.6
Sweden 5.0 2 6 4.3
Finland 5.0 2 6 4.3
Denmark 5.0 6 1.5 4.2
Norway * 4.0 4 4.5 4.2
Australia 5.8 3 3 3.9
Japan * 4.0 6 1.5 3.8
France 5.0 0 6 3.7
Germany 5.0 0 6 3.7
USA 4.9 4 1.5 3.5
New Zealand 3.7 2 4.5 3.4
Canada 5.9 1 3 3.3
UK 5.6 4 0 3.2
Switzerland * 4.0 1 4.5 3.2
Portugal 4.0 0 4.5 2.8
Ireland 5.0 2 0 2.3
Data from EIPA (1998) and OECD (1997). Minimum value of all scales “0”, maximum value “6”.
* Additional information on these countries see acknowledgements.
Again, the USA are a special case because of the large amount of outright political
appointees across the federal administration, filling positions that are not considered as
belonging to the civil service, yet form the top ranks in the federal departments (Heclo
1977). But, in the group actually belonging to the civil service, the ministers in the USA
have less flexibility of choosing their top staff than most of their colleagues in other coun-
tries.
Information about formal politicisation is complemented by information about the rights
to individual political activity for senior civil servants which, as argued above, may influ-
ence the willingness to use an administrative position politically. In the UK and Ireland
followed by Denmark, the United States, Japan, Canada, and Australia top civil servants
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are strongly restricted in these rights. These restrictions go along with only limited possi-
bilities for the government to choose and fire top civil servants. It seems that the strict
policy on political activity is intended to ascertain that senior servants serve their political
master without regard to political beliefs and convictions in the absence of a chance for the
minister to hire political trustees for these top positions. Belgium and Austria differ sharply
in this respect. Even though the government has only limited impact on the selection of top
civil servants they are allowed great freedom of political activity.
Most other countries are rather non-restrictive with regard to the political rights of their
top civil servants as well. But their ministers have better chances to influence the selection
into top positions. This opens the door for the development or sustenance of more strongly
held political convictions and implies that politically active civil servants are more likely to
take a considerable amount of political beliefs and convictions into their jobs. That in turn
is likely to influence the way they are dealing with policy problems. It can be assumed that
independently of any oath of office, a program in accordance with once convictions will be
carried through with more vigour and enthusiasm by most bureaucrats than a program to
which a civil servant feels ideologically opposed (cf. Peters 1995: 32). Hence the assump-
tion that fewer restrictions on the political activities of (top) civil servants will potentially
decrease the chances for politicians to impose their preferences onto the bureaucracy.
In Figure 4 information on the general civil service system is drawn together with the
data on the Senior Executive Service. The countries in the figure are located according to
their CS- and SES-score while the diameter of the circles symbolises the combined CS-
SES score. It can clearly be seen from the figure that the differences in the scores between
the countries are dominated by the CS-Score because all countries with small diameters are
grouped to the left (small CS scores) and those with bigger diameters are grouped to the
right (higher CS scores) but there is no differentiation of diameter in the vertical dimen-
sion. This is not amazing, however, because the CS-Scores had much more variance than
the SES-Scores.
Overall, one can discern three groups. Countries in the first group have high scores in
both SES and CS (Japan to Belgium and France) and countries in the second group have
low CS but high SES scores (Sweden to the United States). The third rather small group
includes only Portugal and Ireland with the characteristic of having high CS but rather low
SES scores. Except for Japan, where both scores tend toward a medium position I find that
at least one of the civil service related scores is high if not both. Turning back to the ques-
tion of this section, that means that in all countries surveyed the civil service does retain
potential to influence decision-making by strategic use of organisational structures.
Bureaucracies have the best chances to influence policy-making this way in Belgium,
Austria, France, Germany. Here both the civil service in general as well as the senior group
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in the civil service appear to be well positioned because recruitment and career structures
are prone to increase coherence of the civil service and similarly decrease the chances to
steer the service politically.
Figure 4: CS/SES Compound Score
Incomplete data for Canada, Greece, Italy, and Spain.
In order not to lose Australia, New Zealand, and the USA for the concluding analysis, data has been
estimated because, for these countries the CS-indicator was the only information substantively missing.
Estimation was done using adjacent cases and verifying the result against qualitative descriptions in OECD
1992 and 1995s.
For the other countries, more information was lacking, so that estimation would have been necessary for
more than one indicator. Additionally, Greece, Italy, and Spain do all belong to the same group of countries.
This means that it would have been difficult to obtain good estimators because of an insufficient number of
similar cases.
4.2 Potential size of core and gate
The theoretical discussion described three sources of bureaucratic impact on policy-
making. After a description of the chances to strategically use organisational structures to
influence policy-making I turn now to the second point, the room to manoeuvre for the
bureaucracy that is described as a function of the number of veto players and decision rules
in cabinet.
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It was demonstrated above that the number of veto players is related to the potential
room to manoeuvre for the bureaucracy because it has defining influence on the potential
size of the core. It can be seen from Table 6 that the potential room to manoeuvre varies
strongly among the observed countries.
On one end of the spectrum are Spain, the UK, Canada, Greece, and New Zealand with
only one veto player. This implies by the mechanism described earlier, that there is no core
in these countries. Hence, there are no or only very few chances for bureaucracies to use
discretionary freedom without political interference. On the other end of the spectrum we
find Finland, Switzerland, Belgium, Japan (in the 1990s only), and Italy where there are
four to five veto players indicating much potential for the existence of a large core with the
respective room to manoeuvre for the bureaucracy.
Table 6: Number of Veto Players and Cabinet Collectivity
(in ascending number of veto players for 1990s)
Mean N Veto Players MeanCountry
N = 19 1980s 1990s
Cabinet deciding
collectively
Spain 1.0 1.0 1.0 n.a.
UK 1.0 1.0 1.0 Yes
Canada 1.0 1.0 1.0 n.a.
New Zealand 1.0 1.1 1.0 n.a.
Greece 1.0 1.0 1.0 n.a.
Norway 1.6 1.3 1.5 Yes
Australia 2.2 1.4 1.8 n.a.
France 1.6 1.5 1.5 No
Austria 1.7 2.0 1.8 No
Portugal 2.6 2.0 2.3 n.a.
Germany 2.3 2.1 2.2 Yes
Ireland 1.5 2.2 1.9 n.a.
Netherlands 2.1 2.2 2.1 Yes
Sweden 1.4 2.5 2.0 n.a.
Denmark 2.5 2.9 2.7 No
USA 3.0 3.0 3.0 No
Finland 4.0 3.9 3.9 n.a.
Switzerland 4.0 4.0 4.0 Yes
Belgium 4.2 4.4 4.3 n.a.
Japan 1.4 4.6 3.0 Yes
Italy 4.6 4.9 4.7 No
Data on number of veto players is from Tsebelis (http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/ tsebelis/vpdata.html). Data on
the USA by analogy of usage from Hammond and Knott 1996.
Data on cabinet collectivity is from Andeweg and Galen 1993, Baylis 1989, Döring 1993, Müller 1992, and
OECD 1992.
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There are a number of countries with significant changes in the average number of veto
players from the 1980s to the 1990s. Namely, these are Ireland, Sweden, and Japan where
the number increased, thus putting the bureaucracy into a potentially better position than
before. On the other hand, there is Portugal where the average number of veto players
decreased over time which decreases the room to manoeuvre for the bureaucracy as well.
The second aspect defining potential bureaucratic influence is the organisation of cabinet
decision-making because, so I argued, collectively acting cabinets can be expected to have
larger gates than cabinets with individual ministerial responsibility. Empirical information
on this issue is presented in the last column of Table 6.
Taking the effects of both indicators together, there seems to be an important potential
for bureaucratic room to manoeuvre in Japan and Switzerland which have both collective
cabinet responsibility and a number of veto players far higher than two (in the 1990s).
Denmark has a high number of veto players as well, but individual policy responsibility by
the ministers is likely to decrease the effect of the great number of veto players on admin-
istrative discretion. Germany and the Netherlands have about two veto players with collec-
tive cabinet responsibility which is likely to increase the room to manoeuvre for the
bureaucracy. The other end of the spectrum is marked by the United Kingdom and Norway
where room to manoeuvre is strongly restricted through the veto constellation although it
may be partly reopened due to the existence of collective cabinet decision-making.
4.3 Bureaucracies as stand-in agenda setters
As outlined in section 2.2.3, the bureaucracy’s chances of becoming an effective agenda
setter depend to a large extent on the resources available to parliament and the cabinet to
form preferences and to advance and process policy proposals. The most obvious resource
indicator for parliament is the size of the parliamentary staff in relation to the ministerial
staff that is outlined below (Table 7).
The huge differences in parliamentary resources between the observed countries are
obvious. On the one hand, there are countries like Germany and Norway with as little as
about seven and eight ministerial bureaucrats per parliamentary staff in the early 1990s. On
the other end of the spectrum is Portugal with 844 bureaucrats per parliamentary staff in
1994. Whereas the first two parliaments are almost at pair with their ministerial bureaucra-
cies as far as work capacity is concerned, the Portuguese parliament seems to have only the
barest chance to keep up with the workings of the ministries. Please note for interpretation
of the figures that all defence staff, ministerial and personal on active military duty, have
been deducted from ministerial personal for reasons outlined in section 3.3.
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To correctly read these numbers it is necessary to take into account that in some coun-
tries part of the implementation tasks are delegated to non-ministerial agencies. This
implies that the ratios of ministerial to parliamentary staff can be somewhat inflated in
countries without agencies. Therefore, whenever possible separate figures for core minis-
terial staff (MinStaffCiv) and staff in ministries plus implementation agencies and
organisations (MinAggStaff) are provided. As it was not always possible to neatly
differentiate between policy-making and implementation staff, additional information on
the existence of independent implementation agencies is given to make up for this short-
coming.
A second fact that has to be kept in mind when interpreting these figures is that federal
countries with strong states (Länder) do also regularly have a very small ratio of parlia-
mentary to core plus implementation staff. Implementation of policy in these systems is in
large part delegated to the state-administrations. Therefore, much of the implementation
staff doesn’t show up in any category of staff figures for the central government, letting the
central government apparatus look comparatively small with and without inclusion of
implementation agencies.
According to column 13 and 14 of Table 7, countries can roughly be grouped into three
classes. The first includes countries with less than 30 (core) ministerial bureaucrats per
parliamentary staff. Taking up the arguments about differences in resource availability, it
can be assumed that in these countries parliament is rather well equipped to keep up with
the bureaucracy and proactively pursue policy-making. The same countries do on the other
hand exhibit a wide range of ratios between parliamentary staff and ministerial plus agency
staff from 53 to almost 650 bureaucrats per parliamentary staff. But this should not affect
the chances for bureaucratic agenda setting to the same extent as the ratio between core
staff and parliament.
In the second group there are countries with between 40 and about 80 bureaucrats per
parliamentary staff. These countries have a much smaller range in the second ratio which
ranges from 49 to about 350 (including two countries, Italy and the Netherlands where
only the latter figures are available).
The third group has core staff ratios from over 100 (Ireland) up to more than 800 bu-
reaucrats per parliamentary staff (Portugal). At the same time, this last group exhibits
extended staff ratios well above the higher values of the first group. The implication is that
parliaments in these countries do have rather limited chances to keep bureaucracies from
active policy-making when it is attempted.
Absolute size of parliamentary staff varies considerably within all three groups but most
in the last group with a parliamentary staff of not more than 115 in Switzerland and more
than 4,000 in Japan. But as absolute staff sizes differ so do sizes of the chambers and,
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underlying all this, of population. It seems therefore plausible to stick with the number of
ministerial bureaucrats per parliamentary staff as a form of standardisation of the data.
We can conclude that from the parliamentary resources point of view the parliaments in
Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Austria, and the United States seem to be in the best
position to establish their own preferences, develop policy proposals, and keep up with the
flow of material from the permanent executive. From this perspective the chances of the
ministerial bureaucracy to stand-in as agenda setter should be more limited in these coun-
tries than in those, where the ratios are less favourable to parliament. With a look at the
time dimension one can also conclude that parliaments did either maintain or improve their
relative position towards the bureaucracy.
In addition to the spatial dimension, the reported data allows us to look at developments
over time. Column 15 shows that up to 14 years of development are covered by the data
and column 16 and 17 reveal that the ratio of parliamentary to ministerial staff either
remained largely constant or moved towards a ratio more favourable for parliament over
time. The two most outstanding cases in this respect are the United Kingdom where the
establishment of the Next Steps agencies over the course of the 1980s led to a remarkable
decrease in core ministerial staff (from 486,000 in 1980 to 58,900 in 1994) and Switzer-
land where ministerial staff remained rather constant but parliamentary staff did increase
by a factor of almost 2.5. This put the Swiss parliament in a much better position versus
the bureaucracy in the 1990s than in the 1980s and before. From a resource point of view,
it can be summarised that the chances for the bureaucracy to stand-in as agenda setter
remained stable or decreased over time.
The second resource defining parliamentary ability to restrain room for bureaucratic
discretion and agenda setting was argued to be the existence and organisation of the com-
mittee system in the parliament. As Table 8 clearly shows, there is a committee system in
place in all surveyed countries in the 1990s and there was only one country, the UK, that
did not have permanent committees in the 1970s.
The number of committees has generally gone up or at least remained stable except for
the Netherlands where there was a major structural realignment in the committee system. A
number of countries where committee jurisdictions did not parallel those of ministries in
the 1970s moved towards a system where this congruence was established (Finland, the
Netherlands, and Australia). This means for the Netherlands that the reduction in the
number of committees (from 35 to 16, which is still a rather high number) is offset by this
structural change. Therefore it does not seem to be reasonable to conclude a weakening of
the position of Dutch parliamentary committees in the process of policy-making.
As Table 8 shows, the number of committees is usually low in countries where jurisdic-
tions do not parallel those of the ministries (in the 1990s these are Belgium, France, Portu-
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gal, Switzerland, and New Zealand). That leaves parliaments in these countries in a com-
paratively weaker position towards their ministerial bureaucracies than in the rest of the
countries where jurisdictions are parallel and the number of committees is usually larger.
Austria is exceptional here because it has an average of 31 committees in the 1990s but
jurisdictions do not parallel those of the ministerial departments.
Table 8: Average Number of Committees and Congruence of Jurisdictions between
Ministries and Parliamentary Committees
(in ascending order of 1990s number of committees)
Country
N = 18
Decade N
Committees
Committees
parallel to
Ministries
Decade N
Committees
Committees
parallel to
Ministries
USA n.a. - - 1990s 39 Yes
Austria 1970s 22.5 No 1990s 31.4 No
Denmark 1970s 21.2 Yes 1990s 24 Yes
Germany 1970s 19.4 Yes 1990s 24 Yes
Sweden 1970s 16 Yes 1990s 16.6 Yes
Finland 1970s 12 No 1990s 12.9 Yes
UK 1970s 1.4 1990s 15.6 Yes
New Zealand 1983-89 13 No 1990s 12.6 No
Netherlands 1970s 35 No 1990s 16 Yes
Italy n.a. - - 1990s 16 n.a.
Norway 1970s 12 Yes 1990s 12 Yes
Portugal 1976-79 12 No 1990s 12 No
Switzerland 1970s 12 No 1990s 12 No
Australia 1973-79 4 No 1990s 8.4 Yes
Belgium 1970s 10 No 1990s 10 No
France 1985-89 6 No 1990s 6 No
Greece 1970s 10 Yes 1990s 6 Yes
Ireland 1970s 6 No 1990s 6 No
Data from WZB project “Parliamentary Structures and Parliamentary Resources” and Ornstein et al. 1997.
No data available for Canada, Japan, and Spain.
Summarising the descriptions, we find first that there is differentiation between the coun-
tries with regard to the committee system as a resource of parliament versus the bureau-
cracy and second that if at all, parliaments moved towards a structure that increased their
resources. As a consequence, they can become more active agenda setters and better con-
trollers of the ministries. The well developed committee systems help to clear preferences
and enable parliament to keep saliency levels high for more policies than before. Stating
this the other way round, i.e. from the viewpoint of the bureaucracies, this means that the
chances for bureaucracies to become active as agenda setters have been stable or decreased
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over the course of the last three decades. This finding is in line with recent research on the
role of parliaments in industrial democracies. It was discovered that parliaments do regain
the importance in policy-making that one believed they had lost in the 1960s and 1970s (cf.
Copeland and Patterson 1994, Döring 1995, Norton 1998).
Taking the evidence from Table 7 and Table 8 together we find that, with the exception
of Austria, countries with a weaker committee system tend to be weaker in general re-
sources as well. Furthermore, the Scandinavian countries, Germany, and the United States
have parliaments with a comparatively higher ability to restrain chances for bureaucratic
agenda setting whereas especially France, Switzerland, Portugal, and, to a slightly lesser
degree, Ireland and Japan have comparatively weaker parliaments.
After having dealt with parliamentary resources to process information and form prefer-
ences, I shall now turn to indexes describing the rights of executive and parliament in the
legislative process, availability of information to parliament, and the time parliament has to
deal with the cabinet budget proposal in relation to the time the cabinet and the bureau-
cracy have to prepare the budget. The qualitative indicators define to what extent the for-
mal rights of parliament allow it to play an active part in political agenda setting whereas
the time factor is another resource indicator describing parliament’s chances to put its for-
mal rights and manpower to any effect.
The indexes in Table 9 are coded “0” to “2” (except time for budgeting). A value of “0”
does always stand for a comparatively weak position of the executive and the bureaucracy
whereas “2” denotes a comparatively strong position of the executive. Details of the coding
scheme are available from Table 18 in the Appendix.
Executive initiative describes the rights of cabinet to initiate legislation relative to the
rights of parliament and other actors (e.g. the electorate) to initiate legislation. A high score
indicates a situation where several actors in parliament (single members, parliamentary
groups, and committees) and sometimes even the electorate have rights to initiate legisla-
tion. This decreases the possibilities for cabinet and bureaucratic agenda setting. The low
scores indicate that few parliamentary actors have the right to initiate legislation, that there
is a quorum if members want to initiate legislation, and that the budget bill is required to
have the approval of the government before being submitted to parliamentary debate. As
can be seen from the table, the rights of the executive to initiate legislation are rather
strong in Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom whereas they
are comparatively weak in Finland, Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland.
The second dimension is called delegation of legislative authority to the executive. In
this dimension high scores indicate that authority to legislate without parliament is trans-
ferred to cabinet regularly with few restrictions and in rather broad areas of policy. Low
scores mean that parliament does always keep a close eye on executive law making and
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does usually retain the right of final approval of those measures. High scores imply better
chances for bureaucratic policy-making than lower scores. Portugal, followed by Italy and
Japan, exhibits a strong position for the executive. On the other hand, the amount of
chances to legislate without parliament, that is delegated to the executive, is rather limited
in Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United
States, and the United Kingdom.
The next two indicators describe the rights of parliament in the legislative process and
are thus “inverse” indicators of the chances of the bureaucracy to stand-in as agenda set-
ters. “Role of parliamentary committees in the legislative process” describes whether the
committee stage is a mandatory stage in the parliamentary process, what role the commit-
tee reports play in the final parliamentary decision procedure, and whether the government
or the respective minister can interfere with the committee amendments. Parliamentary
committees have a comparatively strong standing in Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, and
Switzerland (indicated by the “0” entries in Table 9). This increases the chances of the
parliament to curb active bureaucratic policy-making according to the model. The country
with the smallest acting possibilities for committees is Denmark, leaving much more room
to bureaucratic agenda setting as indicated by a score of 1.6.
“Parliamentary information rights” is an indicator summarising to what extent parlia-
ment is allowed to acquire information from government and non-government sources (for
details see Table 18 in the Appendix). This supports parliament in developing preferences
and thus increases saliency levels of policies. High scores do indicate extensive rights for
parliament to gather information. The US congress is the clear “winner” in this “discipline”
with almost unlimited formal information rights for parliament, but the British parliament
has almost as strong a position. The two parliaments with the most limited formal rights of
information according to this indicator are the Danish and the French parliament. Ireland,
Belgium, and Portugal are also rather weak on this count, the rest of the countries can be
said to have moderate to strong information rights.
Aggregating these four indicators into a summary score, we find the strongest positions
for the executive in the legislative process in Japan (1.2), Denmark, Portugal (both 1.1),
and New Zealand (1.0). Note that the highest scale value of 2.0 is reached in no country. In
fact, the highest empirical value is only slightly above the median value of the scale. This
means that there is no single country where the possibilities of the executive branch to
determine the legislative process are so strong that they completely dominate the parlia-
ment. This can be seen in Portugal, for example, where on the one hand the executive has
very strong rights to autonomously legislate but on the other hand committees play a very
important role in the legislative process that can restrict the executive’s chances to domi-
nate the parliament.
52
Table 9: Strength of Executive in Legislative Process
(in descending order of ”summary score“)
Time in month
allotted for
budgeting to
Factora of
bureau-
cratic
advantage
Country
N = 21
Executive
Initiative
Deleg. of
Leg. to
Executive
Role of
Comm. in
Leg.
Process
Info Rights
of Parlia-
ment
Summary
Score
Exec. Parl.
Japan 1 1.5 1.00 0.8 1.2 7 3 2.3
Denmark 1 0.5 1.67 1.4 1.1 8 5 1.6
Portugal 1 2.0 0.00 1.2 1.1 3 3 1
New Zealand 2 1.0 0.67 0.8 1.0 n.a. n.a. -
Ireland 2 0.5 0.00 1.2 0.9 4 2 2
Norway 1 0.5 1.00 0.6 0.9 9 3 3
France 1 0.0 0.67 1.6 0.8 9 3 3
UK 2 0.0 0.67 0.2 0.7 10 1 10
Australia 1 0.5 1.00 0.4 0.7 6 1 6
Spain 1 0.0 1.33 0.6 0.7 7 3 2.33
Austria 1 0.5 0.67 0.8 0.7 5 3 1.67
Netherlands 2 0.0 0.33 0.4 0.7 9 4 2.25
Belgium 1 0.0 0.67 1.2 0.7 7 4 1.75
Germany 1 0.5 0.33 0.8 0.7 8 5 1.6
Canada 1 1.0 0.33 0.6 0.7 n.a. n.a. -
Greece 1 0.0 1.00 0.4 0.6 5 2 2.5
Italy 0 1.5 0.00 0.8 0.6 7 4 1.75
USA 1 0.0 0.67 0 0.4 7 9 0.78
Finland 0 0.0 0.33 0.8 0.3 8 4 2
Sweden 0 0.5 0.00 0.4 0.2 11 6 1.83
Switzerland 0 0.0 0.00 0.4 0.1 9 3 3
a - Factor of advantage of executive over parliament. This factor is executive time over parliamentary time
for budgeting.
A description of index construction and data sources is given in Table 18 of the Appendix.
Taking all the evidence from Table 7 to Table 9 together, we find a group of countries
always ranking among the top ten. These are Sweden, Germany, the United States, and
Finland. Another group ranks 10 or higher in all tables, namely France, Ireland, Portugal,
and Japan, though the latter has to be seen with reservations due to lack of data in Table 8.
Spain does probably belong in this second group as well. This cannot be said for sure
because of lacking data in Table 7. But in order to rank lower than 10 in this table, Spain
would need parliamentary staff of more than 3,000 people. Comparing its resource struc-
ture with the other countries, this seems very unlikely.
It can be concluded that the parliamentary position in the first group of countries (Swe-
den to Finland) is comparatively strong. Parliaments have a high amount of personal and
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informational resources in order to form preferences and to deal with policies even of
lower levels of saliency. In addition they have an extensive amount of formal rights,
enabling them to effectively amend government proposals which is an important tool in
keeping the bureaucracy from effective agenda setting. The comparatively good endow-
ment with resources gives these parliaments also the chance to be more active in setting the
legislative agenda so that the bureaucracy gets fewer chances to become an agenda setter at
all.
The position of parliament is comparatively weak in the latter group of countries (France
to Japan) with the consequence that there are much higher chances for bureaucratic agenda
setting in these countries. For the rest of the countries the record is more mixed so that no
unequivocal propositions as to the chances for bureaucratic agenda setting seem reason-
able.
Before considering those characteristics that allow a description of chances for bureau-
cratic agenda setting inside the executive, I turn to the role of interest groups as a source of
problem and information input into the politico-administrative system. Interest groups are
stake holders in many political processes and are therefore interested in policy-making as
well. The two basic inputs (problems and information) that interest groups bring into the
political system can be directed towards different players inside this system. It is not of
concern here to ask what is defining to whom interest groups turn first. The interesting
point for this analysis is the empirical question to which political-administrative actors
interest groups in a given country are usually turning.
When civil servants are the main contact of interest groups, as is the case in France,
Germany, or Japan (Table 10), this puts administrators in a favourable position compared
to cabinet and the parliament, because their knowledge about societal problems and possi-
ble remedies can be increased once more through this information channel. Bureaucratic
agenda setting is more likely under these circumstances because ministerial bureaucracies
may be informed of new or emerging problems, when no other actor in the political system
does yet know about them. Bureaucracies can thus go ahead and prepare legislation before
other actors get a chance to become active in this respect or even form preferences.
The opposite position to these countries is taken by the USA and New Zealand. Both are
countries where parliament is reported to be the most important contact of organised inter-
ests in the political system. Ministerial administrators are stripped of an information
advantage here which they posses in most other countries.
In order to get a clearer picture, I group countries according to the criterion of preferred
parliamentary inclusion in the network, equal parliamentary inclusion, and network con-
centration on the executive (with parliament having only a marginal importance). This
classification can be made plausible with the argument that in countries where ministers
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are named first as contacts, it is highly likely that most of the requests and information
from interest groups to ministers is immediately turned over to the departmental bureau-
cracy and hence adding to bureaucratic knowledge and expertise.
Table 10: Main Contacts of Interest Groups
(in alphabetical order of countries)
Country
N=18
To whom do interest groups
usually turn?
Information advantage scorea
Austria CS and Minister 2
Australia Minister and CS 2
Belgium Minister an CS 2
Canada Parliament and CS 0
Denmark CS and Parliament 1
Finland CS and Minister 2
France CS 2
Germany CS 2
Greece Minister and CS 2
Ireland CS and Minister 2
Italy Minister and CS 2
Japan CS 2
Netherlands Minister and CS 2
New Zealand Parliament 0
Norway Minister and CS 2
Portugal n.a. 2
Spain n.a. 2
Sweden CS and Parliament 1
Switzerland Minister and CS 2
UK CS and Minister 2
USA Parliament and CS 0
a - 0 - advantage is with parliament, 1 - parliament and executive are equally contacts of interest groups, 2 -
advantage is with executive
Data is from Andeweg and Galen 1993, Christiansen and Rommetvedt 1999, Coleman and Grant 1988,
Hartmann 1985, Müller 1992, Page 1992, Wilson 1990, and Lavdas 2000.
When grouping countries in this way we find five, namely Canada, the United States, New
Zealand, Sweden, and Denmark, where parliament does play a central role as contact for
interest groups in policy-making matters. For all other countries this source of information
is basically a resource for the executive and the bureaucracy and hence adding to the
bureaucracy’s ability to stand in as agenda setter.
The next group of indicators to be looked at describes the relation between cabinet and
the ministerial administration. Here we also look for evidence that can be interpreted as
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either enhancing or diminishing bureaucratic chances to influence the political agenda
effectively. The first item on the list of indicators compares, as above for parliament, the
resources of the (top) civil service with those of the cabinet, that is I compare size of the
SES group with the size of cabinet and in the follow-up table with additional resources
cabinet can muster.
Table 11: Cabinet Size, Size of SES-Group, and Cabinet-SES-Ratioa
(in ascending order of Ratio SES/Cabinet for 1990s)
Country
N=16
Year Cabinet
size
Size SES-
Group
Ratio
SES/
Cabinet
Year Cabinet
size
Size SES-
Group
Ratio
SES/
Cabinet
New Zealand 1985 20 123 6.2 1994 20 154 8
Sweden n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1991 21 396 19
Ireland 1985 17 449 26.4 1994 15 448 30
Japan 1985 22 689 31.3 1994 21 697 33
Netherlands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1991 14 473 34
Belgium n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1991 18 631 35
Finland 1985 17 656 38.6 1991 17 655 38
Denmark n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1991 19 736 39
Norway n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1991 19 811 21
France n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1991 20 1121 56
Australia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1991 17 1676 99
Germany n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1993 25 2643 106
Austria n.a. - - - 1995 13 1386 107
Switzerland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1994 7 804 115
UK 1985 21 3551 169.1 1994 23 3878 169
USA 1985 13 6818 524.5 1993 14 7432 531
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1994 17 n.a. n.a.
Data for cabinet size from Woldendorp et al. (1993 and 1998), Size of SES group from EIPA 1998, OECD
1997.
a - If figures for points in time more than five years apart have been available, two data points per country
are reported.
The size of the SES group varies strongly between countries. The smallest senior service
group can be found in New Zealand with about 120 people in 1985 and about 150 in 1994.
On the other end of the spectrum are very sizeable groups of more than 7000 senior ser-
vants in the USA (1993) and more than 3800 in the UK (1994). The inclusion of the United
States in this comparison is difficult, however, because of the large amount of political
appointees in Washington whose number does about equal that of people in the American
top civil service. This peculiarity of the American system cannot easily be reflected within
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this empirical framework so that for this indicator Britain seems to be a better standard for
the maximum value.
Cabinet size ranges from 7 to 25, or from 14 to 25 if Switzerland is left out of this com-
parison because of its peculiar institutional set-up. Cabinet size has much smaller variance
than SES-size. The smallest and the largest cabinet differ by a factor of 3.6 (or 1.8 if
Switzerland is excluded) whereas this factor is about 30 for SES-size (with the United
States excluded). It is clear that ministers have a good chance of closely dealing with all or
most members in their SES-group only in a limited number of countries. Taking the gap
between a factor of 56 for France and a factor of 99 for Australia as a “natural” cut-off
point we could say that in Australia, Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA we find
a considerable size advantage of the SES. Switzerland is again special here, because of its
very small cabinet. If it had just the cabinet size of the next ranking country—the Nether-
lands—its SES to cabinet ratio would be at pair with that of France.
Looking at the data over time, we see that for all cases where two data points are avail-
able the SES to cabinet ratio remains largely constant.
The size comparison is only complete, however, when we take into account that there
are countries where the cabinet is supported by additional political executives like junior
ministers (Table 12). Junior ministers and their functional equivalents are counted here as
additional political people dealing with the bureaucracy and sometimes even leading parts
of it. The existence of the post of junior minister therefore increases the amount of political
man-power vis-à-vis the bureaucrats (see Olson 1983: 97-9 for a similar argument). For the
quantitative aggregation the existence of junior ministers is taken as doubling the size of
cabinet. Looking at the examples of the United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway, this
seems to be a conservative evaluation of the size effect because in all these countries the
number of cabinet ministers plus junior ministers or equivalent posts is considerably higher
than twice the size of cabinet.
The support of cabinet ministers through junior ministers seems to be most strongly
developed in countries with British influenced political systems (UK, Australia, and Ire-
land). There junior ministers do not only exist but have policy responsibility of their own.
Although having strong British influence, New Zealand does not have the position of jun-
ior ministers. But given the population size of the country which is less than the population
of Greater London, and the very small size of its SES-group it is hardly surprising not to
find such a differentiation here.
For countries with junior ministers SES to cabinet ratio is substantially decreased. SES
to extended cabinet ratio is for example close to 40 for the UK, if the whole government
comprising about 100 people is taken into consideration instead of cabinet rank ministers
only. Ireland and the Netherlands are special insofar as they do have junior ministers along
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with an already small SES to cabinet ratio, thus giving the political executive an even
better access to the ministerial apparatus. Nothing specific can be said about Greece where
we know that there are junior ministers but no information about the size of the SES was
available.
Table 12: Existence and Responsibilities of Junior Ministers
Do junior ministersCountry
N=20
Are there junior
ministers? have policy
responsibility?
possess staff of their
own?
Australia Yes Yes Yes
Austria No not app. not app.
Belgium No not app. not app.
Denmark n.a. n.a. n.a.
Finland No not app. not app.
France n.a. n.a. n.a.
Germany Yes No Yes
UK Yes Yes Yes
Greece Yes No Yes
Ireland Yes Yes n.a.
Italy No not app. not app.
Japan No not app. not app.
Netherlands Yes No No
New Zealand No not app. not app.
Norway Yes No n.a.
Portugal No not app. not app.
Spain No not app. not app.
Sweden No not app. not app.
Switzerland No not app. not app.
USA No not app. not app.
Data are from OECD 1992.
Taking junior ministers into account, only the USA and Switzerland are left with an SES to
cabinet ratio of well above 100, and no additional support in sight. However, for both
countries this disadvantage must be discounted to some extent as well. In the USA the
cabinet is not a central policy-making body anyway (OECD 1992), and the main political
counterpart of the ministerial bureaucracy is the US Congress not the political executive.
Switzerland has to be treated separately because of its institutional structure, first and
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foremost the strong position of the sovereign in political decision-making which generally
puts the ministerial bureaucracy into a less powerful position than in other countries.
The implications for the ability of the bureaucracy to stand-in as agenda setter are as
straightforward as they were for the problem of parliamentary staff. The more politicians
there are to steer the bureaucracy the smaller its chances to independently start setting po-
litical problems on the agenda and predefining decision results in its own interest. Hence, I
assume that in Sweden as well as in New Zealand ministers should be able to keep a close
eye on the workings of their administrative leaders and be able, by way of having clear
preferences and high levels of saliency for many policies, to make up their own mind on
policy proposals coming up the ranks of the bureaucracy.
It is more difficult to tell, how the infamous Sir Humphrey Appleby (Lynn and Jay
1984) would actually be able to instruct his minister what initiative to take when and how.
On the one hand, there is a high number of senior civil servants in the British system but
on the other hand there is quite a large number of politicians in the government so that the
ratios of politicians to top servants are effectively much smaller than they initially appear.
The same holds true for Germany and Australia where the cabinet to SES ratios are rather
large but cabinet is supported by junior ministers, who even share the policy responsibility
of the minister in the case of Australia. The situation seems to be least favourable for
France, and Switzerland (the USA is left out here for the above mentioned reasons) where
the SES to cabinet ratio is rather large but there are no junior ministers to support the min-
ister in steering her large bureaucracy and watching the political process in order to be
ahead of the bureaucracy in putting problems on the political agenda.
The chances of parliament and cabinet to restrain bureaucratic agenda setting as a func-
tion of their respective endowment with resources have now been described. There is a last
point from the theoretical discussion that has not yet been taken up in this section—the
parliamentary support base of the incumbent government. It was argued above that a strong
parliamentary support base of the government increases the chances for effective bureau-
cratic agenda setting and vice versa because the chances of parliamentary approval of gov-
ernment proposals are different with different types of parliamentary support. Table 13
gives an impression of the actual parliamentary support that cabinets had in the various
countries.
There are a number of countries that stand out as having a high share of single party
majority governments, namely the UK, New Zealand, and Spain, where there was a single
party majority government more than 90% of the time, and Greece coming close to 90%.
Note that these four countries are the same countries that were noted in Table 6 as having
one veto player. From a type of government point of view, there are good chances for
bureaucratic agenda setting in the above countries. In contrast, Denmark, Sweden, and
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Norway exhibit parliamentary support structures that seem to strongly disfavour
bureaucratic agenda setting because there is no reliable base of parliamentary support for
the government which in turn could support a strong position for bureaucratic agenda
setting.
Table 13: Types of Government for the Period from 1960 to 1995
Country
N=20
Single Party
Majority
Majority Coalition
Government
Minority
Government
Caretaker
Government
UK 99 - 1 -
New Zealand 97 3 - -
Spain 92 1 7 -
Greece 89 9 - 2
Japan 76 14 10 -
Portugal 65 27 3 4
Australia 44 56 - -
Ireland 38 42 20 -
Austria 33 60 7 -
Switzerland - 100 - -
Germany - 98 - 2
Netherlands - 97 - 3
Belgium - 94 1 5
France 5 81 14 -
Finland - 85 10 6
Italy - 71 26 3
USA 39 - 61 -
Norway 5 22 73 -
Denmark - 25 78 -
Sweden 6 10 83 -
Data from Woldendorp et al. (1993 and 1998). Data for Spain, Portugal, Greece, and the USA from Perotti
and Kontopoulos 1998. The years 1967-73 for Greece, 1960-74 for Portugal, and 1960-75 for Spain are not
included. The US-Government was coded as minority government when the majority party in Congress was
not the same as the party of the incumbent President.
Similar things can be said about the United States that experienced shared government
(coded here as minority government according to Perotti and Kontopoulos 1998) for about
60 percent of the period from 1960 to 1995. We have already seen in the above descrip-
tions that the position of the ministerial bureaucracy is comparatively weak in the United
States in general. Turning back to the point of bureaucratic agenda setting, we would not
expect to find much of this in the United States.
For countries with majority coalitions (instead of single party majorities) matters are
more complicated, but we can, nevertheless, expect more stable support than for minority
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governments. This means that the chances for bureaucratic agenda setting in the countries
from Australia to Italy in Table 13 are likely to be better than in the Scandinavian countries
or the United States but not as good as in the United Kingdom, Greece, etc.
I have now provided many details on the position of bureaucracies in national polities
across the OECD world. The task to be accomplished in the last section of this paper is to
wrap up the discussion and to develop some tentative conclusions from the material pre-
sented.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper started with three questions:
1) Can the potential ability of ministerial bureaucracies to influence policy-making be
theoretically conceptualised in a meaningful way?
2) Is it possible to find quantitative indicators that capture elements of such a theoretical
concept?
3) How do different countries compare with regard to the potential of their national level
bureaucracies to influence policy-making?
I shall take up these three questions in turn in this concluding section.
In order to answer the first one, a theoretical framework has been established within
which the question of structural conditions of bureaucratic influence on policy-making can
be further analysed. I have outlined three different ways how ministerial bureaucracies
may influence policy-making.
The first way is the strategic use of organisational structures within the bureaucracy to
influence the content of policy decisions when the decision-making process has already
been started. It was argued that bureaucracies with a classical or closed organisational
structure (one could also qualify them as Weberian bureaucracies) are more likely to pro-
vide ample chances for the strategic use of these structures than more open or businesslike
structures.
The second possibility of bureaucratic influence on policy-making was described as the
exploitation of sets in the policy space that are left as room to manoeuvre to the bureau-
cracy as a function of the number of actors (veto players) and their preference configura-
tions. It was demonstrated that there may be sets of policies which are superior to all poli-
cies outside this set but which cannot defeat or be defeated by other policies from this set.
This set was called the “core.” This core can be seen as room to manoeuvre for the bu-
reaucracy where it can change policies according to its preferences without political inter-
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ference as long as the changes stay inside this core. The available room to manoeuvre for
the bureaucracy was then extended through the introduction of the “gate.” The gate is
defined as a set of policies within which a player with decisive influence on the political
agenda will not propose policy changes for fear of ending with a final decision further
away from her ideal point than the status quo.
Third, I introduced as a way of bureaucratic influence on policy-making the chance for
the bureaucracy to effectively stand in as agenda setter. An effective agenda setter was
defined as one who by setting the agenda does already have decisive influence on the deci-
sion outcome. Using a concept of saliency I integrated the different resource strengths of
the bureaucracy, cabinet, and parliament into a framework where as a function of resources
and preference configurations bureaucracies may get the chance to bring issues and solu-
tions onto the political agenda with a high chance of moving policy to a point close to their
own ideal point.
Summarising this discussion I provided in Table 3 a framework where the chances for
bureaucracies to influence policy-making were described as the aggregated chances that
accrue from a three-dimensional framework. These dimensions are the structural strength
of the bureaucracy itself, the ability of parliament to actively pursue policy-making, and
the ability of cabinet to pit itself against the bureaucracy. As this theoretical aggregation
shows, it seems feasible to conceptualise bureaucratic influence on policy-making beyond
abstract constructs and with an orientation towards empirical application.
This takes us to the second question about the feasibility of an empirical evaluation of
the model. In section 3 I put forward a rather extensive operationalisation of the theoretical
constructs. Because there is not yet an agreed upon set of variables in the field of com-
parative administrative research, detailed justifications for the indicators were given. It was
thus possible to demonstrate that an empirical application of the above theory is feasible.
That leaves us with the last question of how different countries compare with regard to
the potential impact of their national level bureaucracies on policy-making.
In chapter 4 a quantitative empirical description of 21 OECD-countries (with some drop-
outs due to unavailability of data) was presented with the aim of comparing the relative
strengths of their national ministerial bureaucracies. The results are summarised in the
following paragraphs.
Table 14 is a uni-dimensional classification with regard to the relative strength of the
national bureaucracies in relation to those of the other inspected countries. It is a compara-
tive quantitative evaluation of these systems across the OECD-world.
The summary ranks in Table 14 are an aggregation of the rank positions the countries
occupied in the several tables in section 4. When there were less countries with sufficient
information than 21 ranks have been standardised as to always span the whole range from
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1 to 21. This was done in order to be able to aggregate the rank positions into a summary
rank. The summary rank is the sum of the individual ranks in the various categories di-
vided by the number of available rank positions for each country. The position of Canada,
Greece, Italy, and Spain could not have been completely evaluated due to lack of more
than one indicator in which case aggregation seemed to be to insecure. These countries are
therefore listed in the bottom of Table 14 in smaller print.
Table 14: Summary: Combined Rank of Strength of Bureaucracy across Countries
(in descending order of summary rank)
Country
N = 17 (21)
Structural
Strength of
Bureaucracy
Strength of
Parliament
(Resources)
Strength of
Parliament.
(TOG)
Strength of
Cabinet (N-
Vetoplayers)
Strength of
Cabinet
(Resources)
Contact
Interest
Groups
Summary
Rank
Ranka Rank Ranka Rank Ranka Rank
Japan 9.8 3.2 5.3 2 14.4 1 5.94
Portugal 7.4 7.3 6.3 12 n.a. 1 6.80
France 3.7 3.9 11.6 14 7.9 1 7.00
Belgium 1.2 8.5 15.8 3 13.1 1 7.09
Austria 2.5 15.3 10.5 12 3.9 1 7.53
Switzerland 17.2 10.1 12.6 4 2.6 1 7.91
Ireland 7.4 4.2 9.5 9 19.7 1 8.46
UK 20.9 8.6 1.1 18 5.2 1 9.14
Germany 4.9 18.2 13.7 11 6.6 1 9.22
Australiab 16.0 7.8 7.4 15 9.2 1 9.38
Netherlands 12.3 9.8 14.7 9 15.7 1 10.43
Norway 6.2 4.8 18.9 16 17.0 1 10.66
USAb 12.3 18.4 8.4 6 1.3 19 10.90
Finland 14.8 16.1 16.8 5 11.8 1 10.92
Denmark 11.1 14.0 20.0 7 10.5 17 13.26
New Zealandb 19.7 12.3 2.1 17 21.0 19 15.17
Sweden 18.5 17.6 21.0 7 18.3 17 16.58
Canadac n.a. 17.0 n.a. 18 n.a. 19 n.a.
Greecec n.a. 7.8 4.2 18 n.a. 1 n.a.
Italyc n.a. 12.9 17.9 1 n.a. 1 n.a.
Spainc n.a. 8.0 3.2 18 n.a. 1 n.a.
a - Ranks are adjusted to fill the range 1 to 21 even though data was available for less than 21 countries.
b - Rank position of CS-structure estimated for this country (see Figure 4).
c - For this country more than one index is missing. Summary rank position for this country therefore not
available.
The empirical classification demonstrates that the attempt to empirically differentiate the
administrative systems of the OECD-countries was successful. Japan stands out as the
country with the strongest position of the bureaucracy in national policy-making. It is
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followed in rank by a number of continental European countries, namely France, Portugal,
Belgium, and Austria. At the other end of the spectrum, where bureaucracy is compara-
tively weak in relation to the other countries, are Finland, Denmark, and Sweden as Scan-
dinavian as well as the United States and New Zealand as countries with British Heritage.
The mere quantitative results do not seem sufficient, however, for a useful interpretation of
the results. Therefore I provide in Figure 5 a more qualitatively oriented grouping of the
countries along the three theoretical dimensions outlined above and in Table 3.
Instead of just aggregating ranks, countries are here categorised into groups with
different combinations of chances to effect policy-making for the bureaucracy, the cabinet,
and parliament. The three dimensions in Figure 5 are meant to represent the three
theoretically discussed dimensions of bureaucratic influence. The “structural position of
the bureaucracy” resembles the chances of the bureaucracy to influence policy-making by
the strategic use of organisational structures and “resources of parliament” resembles the
dimension of administrative agenda setting. “Resources of cabinet” captures the room to
manoeuvre that bureaucracy can use without political interference but covers aspects of
administrative agenda setting as well because the indicators for cabinet resources do enter
into this summary measure.
All countries inhabiting the four cells in the foreground are countries with strong or
moderately strong parliaments whereas those in the background have weak or moderately
weak parliaments. The top half of the three-dimensional space is inhabited by countries
with structurally strong bureaucracies, the bottom half with countries with structurally
rather weak bureaucracies. The right half of the space is filled by countries who exhibit
rather strong cabinets with the opposite being true for the left half.
In order to place countries in this space, their rank positions on the various dimensions
were transformed into the dichotomous categories high and low and placed in the space
accordingly. Not for all countries was this classification unequivocal because parliament as
well as cabinet are represented by two ranks in Table 14. When the two indicators for
cabinet strength did not point in the same direction the number of veto players was used as
the decisive indicator. The reason for this is that number of veto players covers the dimen-
sion of bureaucratic room to manoeuvre whereas the cabinet resource level has elements of
the agenda setting dimension as well. Giving number of veto players priority over the other
indicator in aggregation secures a more appropriate interpretation of the data.
Parliamentary indicators were used similarly. Here the indicator on parliamentary re-
sources was taken as decisive indicator because it summarises the information from Table
7 to Table 9 and is therefore much “heavier” than the type of government indicator. In
addition, the resource indicator covers conceptual elements, the level of saliency as well as
the action possibilities of parliament, whereas type of government does only cover the
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latter aspect. This is reason enough to make it the decisive part in case of unequal group-
ing.
Figure 5: Summary: Strength of Bureaucratic Impact on Policy-Making as a Function of
Resource Differences and Bureaucratic Structures
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There is another “problem” with the way results are presented in Figure 5: the placement
of median cases. A good example is Japan that missed by a small margin the third quadrant
because it belongs in the “strong bureaucracies” group just by a narrow margin of one rank
position. The groupings can be called empirically meaningful, nevertheless, because it was
possible to almost exactly reproduce them by way of cluster analysis on the rank positions
from Table 144. The only deviating case was Finland which was grouped together with the
Netherlands and Switzerland both located in an adjacent quadrant of the figure.
The pure types—all dimensions pointing towards a strong (quadrant I) and a weak
bureaucracy respectively (quadrant VIII)—in the table are inhabited by Japan, Belgium,
and Ireland for the all strong and New Zealand for the all weak type.
Quadrants I and II are filled with countries ranking in the top positions in Table 14 with
the exception of Norway, which is located here as well but has only a middle rank in the
table. Quadrants VII and VIII are filled with the low rankers. This is by and large in line
with interpretations from Table 3. There it was said that the equivalent cell of quadrant I
represents the strongest position of the bureaucracy followed by quadrants II, III, and V
                                                
4 The application of different clustering algorithms did not or only marginally change the results. A two-
dimensional scaling of the data with different distance measures did reproduce the above groupings as
well with an acceptable stress value.
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where only one source of bureaucratic strength is lacking. Then there are quadrants VII,
VI, and IV where bureaucracy does only gain potential strength in one dimension and last
quadrant VIII where bureaucracy is in a comparatively weak position on all three dimen-
sions.
To turn this into a more substantial interpretation, we can say that the Japanese, Belgian,
and Irish bureaucrats seem to have good chances to influence policy-making through all
three channels of influence, i.e. strategic action, exploitation of the room to manoeuvre,
and effective agenda setting. For the French, Norwegian, and Portuguese administrators the
chances to use bureaucratic room to manoeuvre are somewhat limited by a rather strong
cabinet whereas the Swiss and Dutch bureaucracies are weakened by their own structure
that decreases the chances to strategically use organisational structures to influence deci-
sion-making. In Australia and the UK only the comparatively weak parliament leaves the
bureaucracy some influence whereas in Germany and Austria the bureaucratic structure
itself the bureaucracy to retain influence. In the three Scandinavian countries and the USA
in quadrant VII a rather weak cabinet leaves some room to manoeuvre to the bureaucracy
and last not least, in New Zealand there is no single dimension where bureaucracy can
really be called strong.
We have now, as an answer to the third question a quantitative empirical classification
of administrative systems that did not exist in the same fashion before. Whether the poten-
tial of the bureaucracy is actually put into effect will have to be tested against measures of
policy output and the actual results of national policy-making, i.e. policy outcomes.
Likewise, will it have to be tested whether the different dimensions aggregated into bu-
reaucratic strength in Table 14 do really carry the same weight or whether one is more
important for the impact of bureaucracies on national policy-making than the others. But
these tasks must be left to future research.
66
Appendix: Data Sources and Coding Schemes
Table 15: Indicators Describing the Civil Service (CS)—Data Sources and Coding
Schemesa
Variable Name Variable Description Variable Coding
MinStaff Data based on OECD 1992, OECD 1993s, OECD
1995s.
-
MinAggStaff Data based on OECD 1992, OECD 1993s, OECD
1995s.
-
Data for this and the following indicators from Auer,
Demmke and Polet 1996 except for Data on Japan,
Norway, and Switzerland which are from Kikuti Masao,
Meji University, Tokio, Japan; Tom Christensen,
University of Oslo, Norway; and Ulrich Kloeti,
University of Zurich, Switzerland respectively.
CompTr Compulsory training/training compulsory for
promotion?
Yes - 1, No - 0
FormPro Are there formal recruitment procedures? Yes - 1, No - 0
NoProfE Is prior experience in private sector recognised for job
classification?
Yes - 0, No - 1
PerfRelP Is pay performance related? Yes - 0, No - 1
PermTen Is employment for life/ is the employment system a
tenure system?
Yes - 1, No - 0
ProgrPay Is there a set progression in pay? Yes - 1, No - 0
PublAdJ Are jobs advertised in public? Yes - 0, No - 1
Recruitm Does recruitment occur only to entry level positions? Yes - 1, No - 0
RekrutZ Is recruitment centralised? Yes - 1, No - 0
Seniority Is the promotion system a seniority system? Yes - 1, No - 0
SpecEdu Are specific diplomas needed for a specific career? Yes - 1, No - 0
SpefLab Is there specific legislation to regulate labour relations
in the public sector (or is it the general labour law, that
governs employment in the public sector)?
Yes - 1, No - 0
StateRemun Is there a statutory remuneration scheme in place? Yes - 1, No - 0
CompTrain Is there a training/probationary period for beginners? Yes - 1, No - 0
a - A value of “1” stands for a closed tendency of the item, “0” stands for an open tendency of the item. For a
justification of the coding and aggregation of the index see Auer, Demmke and Polet 1996 passim.
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Table 16: Indicators Describing the Senior Executive Service (SES)—Data Sources and
Coding Schemesa
Index Variable
Name
Variable Description Variable Coding
SES size NoSes Size of the SES according to EIPA 1998 and
OECD 1997.
Data for this and the following indicators
based on OECD 1997 except for Data on
Japan and Switzerland which are from Kikuti
Masao, Meiji University, Tokio, Japan, and
Ulrich Kloeti, University of Zurich,
Switzerland respectively.
SES recruitment
system
Recruit1 Is there a central agency involved in SES
recruitment?
Yes - 1, No - 0
Recruit2 Are there standard selection criteria? Yes - 1, No - 0
Recruit3 Is there open advertisement of positions ? Yes - 0, No - 1
Recruit4 Are there formal access conditions for senior
positions?
Yes - 1, No - 0
Recruit5 Is there a formal selection process? Yes - 1, No - 0
FixOpen Are employment contracts for senior servants
for a fixed period or open ended?
Fix - 0, Open ended - 1
ExistSpe Is there a separate senior civil service group
in the civil service (or do all servants belong
under the same regulations)?
Yes - 0, No - 1
Contract Are senior servants employed under general
labour law (contract) or under a special civil
service statue?
majority employed on
contract basis - 0,
majority employed on
civil service statue - 1
Formal
Politicisation
FireT Can senior servants be laid of at the will of
the current government/current minister?
Yes - 0, No - 1
ExchWG Is there a turnover in SES posts, when
government changes?
Yes - 0, Yes, but used
rarely - 0.5, No - 1
MinAppt Does the minister of the day have a say in the
appointment of senior civil servants?
Yes - 0, No - 1
Political
Acitivity of
Senior Servants
PolAct1 Participation in public debate on political
issues.
Allowed - 1, Forbidden/
Restricted - 0
PolAct2 Membership in political parties. Allowed - 1, Forbidden/
Restricted - 0
PolAct3 Contesting national elections while still a
public servant.
Allowed - 1, Forbidden -
0
PolAct4 Holding a seat in the national legislature
while still a public servant.
Allowed - 1, Forbidden -
0
a - The coding for the recruitment system follows the same reasoning as the coding for the civil service
system in general (Auer, Demmke and Polet 1996: passim).
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Table 17: Indicators Describing Cabinet Activities—Data Sources and Coding Schemes
Variable Name Variable Description Variable Coding
NoCabi Size of the cabinet. Data based on Woldendorp et al.
(1993 and 1998).
-
CollCab Is cabinet collectively policy responsible expressis
verbis? Data based on Andeweg and Galen 1993,
Baylis 1989, Döring 1993, Müller 1992, OECD 1992.
Yes/No
ExtAgen Are there independent (implementation) agencies?
Data based on OECD 1992.
Yes/No
JunMin Are there junior ministers? Data based on OECD
1992.
Yes/No
JunMinP Do junior ministers have policy responsibility of their
own? Data based on OECD 1992.
Yes/No
JunMinS Do junior ministers have personal staff? Data based on
OECD 1992.
Yes/No
Table 18: Indicators Describing Characteristics of Parliament—Data Sources and Coding
Schemes
Index Variable Variable description Variable Coding
ParlStaff Number of parliamentary support personnel.
Data based on OECD 1992, OECD 1995s
and WZB Project on Parliamentary
Resources.
-
Executive Initiative Index aggregated from the 6 items below according to the following formula:
2 - ( (MemIni + ParlGrIni + ComIni + ElectIni) - (BudgetGovt + MemQuorum) )
Index is set to 0 if the term is smaller then 0. Index is standardised to a value range
from 0-2.
MemIni Do members of the House have the right to
initiate legislation? Data based on IPU 1986:
table 29, p. 859 ff.
1 - Yes, 0 - No
ParlGrIni Do parliamentary groups have the right to
initiate legislation? Data based on IPU 1986:
table 29, p. 859 ff.
1 - Yes, 0 - No
ComIni Do committees have the right to initiate
legislation? Data based on IPU 1986: table
29, p. 859 ff.
1 - Yes, 0 - No
ElectIni Does the electorate have the right to initiate
legislation? Data based on IPU 1986: table
29, p. 859 ff.
1 - Yes, 0 - No
BudgetGovt Is there a budget prerogative for the gov-
ernment? Data based on IPU 1986: table 29,
p. 859 ff.
1 - Yes, 0 – No
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Index Variable Variable description Variable Coding
MemQuorum Is there a quorum for members initiative?
Data based on IPU 1986: table 29, p. 859 ff.
1 - Yes, 0 – No
Delegation of Legis-
lation to Executive
Index is the following difference: ExpLeg – ParlApprov
Index is set to 0 if the term is smaller then 0. Index is standardised to a value range
from 0-2.
ExpLeg Constitutional rules regulating delegation of
legislation to Executive. Data based on IPU
1986: Table 35, p. 1027 ff.
4 - permanent delegation of broad
policy fields
3 - temporary delegation of broad
policy fields
2 - delegation as part of statutory
regulation of policy problem
1 - delegation only in exceptional
circumstances with immediate par-
liamentary approval
ParlApprov Sovereignty of parliament on delegated
legislation. Data from IPU 1986: Table 35,
p. 1027 ff.
3 - approval always needed, 2 - ap-
proval not needed but parliament may
annul exec. legislation, 1 - parlia-
mentary scrutiny possible
Role of Comm Index is the sum of the three items below that is standardised to a value range from
0-2.
CommStComp Is committee stage compulsory? Data based
on IPU 1986: Table 33, p. 961 ff.
0 - No, 1 - Sometimes, 2 - always
DisBill How are bills discussed in parliament? Data
based on IPU 1986: Table 33, p. 961 ff.
2 - as redraftet by committee, 1 - as
drafted by government with commit-
tee amendments added, 0 - committee
amendments discussed in parliament
only with consent of government/
minister
AddExp May committees muster additional exper-
tise? Data based on IPU 1986: Table 33, p.
961 ff.
yes without limitations - 2, yes, but
only govt. sources - 1, no - 0
Information Rights of
Parliament
Index constructed as sum of the 9 items below. Index is standardised to a value
range from 0-2.
CommCorMin Do committees roughly correspond with
ministerial departments? Data based on IPU
1986, Table 20.3.
1 - Yes or broadly yes, 0 - No
DisCommChair How is position of committee chairmen
distributed between parties? Data based on
IPU 1986, Table 21.2.
1 - proportional between all parl.
parties, 0 - most or all chairs to
governing party/parties
FunctStaff What are the functions of a committee sec-
retariat? Data based on IPU 1986, table 21.4.
0 - only administrative functions, 1 -
both, research and administrative
functions, 2 - only research functions
DocBefComm Do committees have the right to call for
documents? Data based on IPU 1986, Table
23.5.
1 - Yes, 0 - No
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Index Variable Variable description Variable Coding
OffBefCcomm Can government officials be summoned
before committee? Data based on IPU 1986,
table 23.1a.
1 - Yes, 0 - No
WitBefComm Do committees have the right to summon
witnesses? Data based on IPU 1986, table
23.4.
1 - Yes, 0 - No
MinBefComm Do committees have the right to call minister
before committee? Data based on IPU 1986,
Table 23.6.
1 - Yes, 0 - No
MinResp Are ministers individually or collectively
responsible to parliament? Data based on
IPU 1986, table 40.1.
2 - individually, 1 - both,
0 - collectively
AdminAcc Is administration accountable to parliament?
Data based on IPU 1986, Table 42.1.
2 - yes directly, 1 - yes, through
minister, 0 - no
budget time for
executive
Time in month that the executive has to deal with developing the budget proposal.
Data from OECD 1987, OECD 1995, Harden and Hagen 1994.
budget time for
parliament
Time in month that parliament has to deal with the budget proposal. Data from
OECD 1987, OECD 1995, Harden and Hagen 1994.
Table 19: Type of Government and Main Contact of Interest Groups
Variable Name Variable Description Variable Coding
TOG Type of Government. Data from Woldendorp et
al. (1993 and 1998).
1 - Single Party Majority Government
2 - Multiple Party Majority Government
3 - Oversized Coalition Government
4 - Single Party Minority Government
5 - Minority Coalition Government
6 - Caretaker Government
ExtInt Who is main contact of interest groups? Data
based on Andeweg and Galen 1993, Christiansen
and Rommetvedt 1999, Coleman and Grant 1988,
Hartmann 1985, Müller 1992, Page 1992, Wilson
1990.
Data on the following countries from private
conversation:
- Australia with Mark Considine, University of
Melbourne, Australia,
- Greece with Kostas.A. Lavdas, University of
the West England, UK,
- Switzerland with Ulrich Kloeti, University of
Zurich, Switzerland.
1 - PM
2 - Ministers
3 - Ministers and civil service
4 - Civil service and Ministers
5 - Parliament
6 - Parliament and civil service
7 - civil service and Parliament
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